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This study reviews the development of the banking and insurance sectors in Nepal and the 
effect of reforms and commitments linked to these sectors since the 1980s, when financial sector 
liberalization in Nepal began with deregulation of the interest rate structure and opening of the 
banking sector to foreign investors. Now, three fourth of foreign equity participation is permissible 
in the banking sector. The insurance sector is almost fully liberalized with 100 per cent foreign 
equity participation on a case by case basis. The liberalization of banking and insurance has helped 
to diversify the banking sector resulting in financial deepening. The contribution of finance and 
real estate sector to employment reached 11.46 per cent of total employment in 2005, from 9.29 
per cent in 1990. A rapid increase in total financial assets of the financial institutions also took 
place during the period 1990 to 2005. 
 
Despite these positive developments, the financial sector is experiencing serious difficulties. 
The cost of capital is still high and the financial system relatively inefficient, as the gap between 
deposit and lending rate indicates. Access to financial services in rural areas also remains a major 
problem. At the same time, Nepal is in a process of further opening up banking and insurance in 
meeting WTO obligations.  
 
As a party to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in 2004 Nepal 
committed to opening up of the financial sector. Foreign equity participation in domestic bank has 
been allowed up to 67 percent. More importantly, Nepal has committed to allow wholesale 
banking by 2010. The presence of natural persons has been restricted both for market access and 
national treatment purposes. In the case of insurance, there is no restriction on market access in 
mode 2 and 3 except for free reinsurance and retrocession. Mode 1 and 2, however, intend that 
mandatory reinsurance up to USD 25000 by December 2007.  Mode 3 is unbound until 31 
December 2007 and mode 4 supply is fully unbound. With respect to the limitations on national 
treatment, Nepal has committed to none for mode 1, 2 and 3. For mode 4, it is unbound. Services, 
including financial services, are not yet the subject matter of SAFTA and BIMSTEC.  
 
Regression analysis of the linkage between financial deepening and economic growth shows 
a strong relationship. It also suggests that credit to the private sector is the best measure of 
financial development or financial intermediation. Despite state owned banks passing through a 
crisis as a result of non-performing loans, rapid expansion in financial institutions and their 
lending portfolios promoted growth. 
 
Comparative case studies of three banks, namely RBB, NIBL and SCBNL, suggest that the 
joint venture banks generally achieve the highest performance, followed by the private domestic 
banks and the state owned banks. Despite steady expansion in employment in private domestic and 
joint venture banks, total employment declined sharply after 2002 as a result of drastic cuts by the 
state owned banks as part of ongoing reforms and restructuring. Estimates of net interest margin, 
profits before tax, and overhead costs show that a sharp fall in the interest margin to total assets 
took place in private domestic banks, indicating diversification of bank services. The joint venture 
banks at the same time have maintained constant but lower margins. The profit before tax to total 
assets also shows a steadily declining trend in these banks, indicating increased competition. The 
opposite trend, however, was observed in the government banks.   6
Nepal's experience shows that structural and institutional reforms should be part and parcel 
of liberalization policies. Institutional capacity enhancement of the Central Bank and effectiveness 
in prudential regulations are crucial for making ongoing reform effective and result oriented.  
 
Reforms in ownership and market structures will be particularly important in view of Nepal's 
commitment to allow foreign wholesale banking and insurance companies in the domestic market. 
Raising the capital base of the banks and removing government control and interference in the two 
banks (NBL and RBB) will be necessary. 
 
Nepal's experience with financial liberalization suggests that the multilateral route could be 
beneficial in pursuing broader trade liberalization policies. By the same token, the speedy 
introduction of new Acts in fulfilling commitments under WTO may strengthen market 
institutions.  
 
One of the problems experienced in the course of intensive liberalization is that, despite 
financial deepening, access to credit by the rural population has not improved. This is also true of 
small businesses operating in urban areas. In order to overcome this, policy should focus on the 
growth of micro credit institutions and community - based self-help, saving and credit groups and 
cooperatives. This will ease pressures on the Government or Central Bank in forcing commercial 
banks to divert resources to less profitable, more risky ventures. It may also prevent crowding out 
of funds available to the private sector. 
   7
 I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
Liberalization policies in Nepal were started in the mid-1980s. A severe foreign exchange 
crisis, emanating from excessive reliance on deficit financing had forced the government to pursue 
market oriented reforms. However, more intensive and wide-ranging reforms were pursued only 
after the restoration of democracy in 1990. While augmenting reforms, attempts were also made to 
remove various distortions impeding growth. The speed and direction of reforms were also 
affected by the reforms driven in India, given Nepal’s open border and special trade relations with 
that country.  
 
To expedite economic liberalization, a major devaluation of the Nepalese currency was 
made in 1991. Liberalization and privatization received impetus after the implementation of the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1992. To institutionalize the reform process and develop appropriate market institutions, 
the Industrial Enterprises Act and the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act were 
brought into effect in 1992. The Privatization Act was introduced in 1994. License and quota 
systems were gradually removed. On the trade front, quantitative restrictions on imports through 
license were completely abolished, and tariffs on imports were drastically slashed. Foreign 
exchange was also gradually liberalized to ensure its compatibility with the reforms in trade. The 
Nepalese currency was made fully convertible on the current account with no foreign exchange 
controls. A more open up policy was pursued in the area of foreign investment by allowing foreign 
investments up to 100 per cent of issued capital in large and medium industries. This was followed 
by the removal of entry barriers to foreign investors in the financial sector. In banking, three fourth 
of foreign equity participation is now permissible. The insurance sector is almost fully liberalized 
in which up to 100 percent foreign equity participation on a case by case basis is allowed. 
Following the enforcement of a new Act in 2002, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), the country’s 
central bank, has been granted greater autonomy and full authority to conduct monetary policy. 
The NRB has also been given full authority and responsibility to play an effective supervisory 
role. Implementation of more prudential regulatory and supervision systems is a part and parcel of 
the ongoing financial sector reform. A liberalized trade regime also enabled Nepal to obtain   
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004, which in turn has obligated Nepal 
to pursue more trade liberalization policies.  
 
 
Following financial sector liberalization in Nepal in mid 1980s, financial deepening is 
taking place at a faster pace. A major diversification in the ownership structure of the financial 
system is a lsotaking place.  Not only is there a steady rise in the contribution of banking and 
insurance services to the country's value added, but also the banking and insurance services are 
helping to boost business and industry including international trade. Foreign equity participation is 
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1.2 Definition of the Banking and Insurance Sectors  
 
Financial services usually include banking, insurance, securities, asset management, 
pension funds, financial advisory, information and other services
1. These services are commonly 
associated with the supply of financial instruments
2. Financial services are divided into banking 
and non-banking services. Banking institutions provide banking and other financial services to 
their customers. They render services to the customers in terms of both deposits and lending by 
performing the role of intermediating for savers and borrowers.  
 
Non-baking financial institutions include insurance and other fund management services. 
Insurance companies are the most important non-banking financial institutions. An insurance 
company operates as an insurer
3. Insurance companies collect premiums and compensate losers. It 
operates on three principles—the sharing of losses, the participation of large numbers of people, 
and the quality of risk. Insurance companies not only shift the risks but also collect small scattered 
capital and invest it in various activities of long-term nature.   
 
 
1.3 Review of the Literature 
 
The financial system  mobilizes financial resources, facilitates  risk management, 
distributes resources to the most efficient sectors and activities, monitors the use of financial 
resources (exerting corporate governance), and provides a payment system that makes trade 
among economic participants more efficient (Levine, 1997). Financial development occurs when a 
financial system is able to improve the performance of these functions. There is a large body of 
theoretical and empirical work emphasizing that financial development is positively related to 
economic growth (Hermes and Lensink, 2005).  
While there may be several different characterizations of financial liberalization, there is a 
growing view, shared by these authors,  that financial liberalization includes policies that focuses 
on deregulating credit controls, deregulating interest rate controls, removing entry barriers for 
foreign financial institutions, privatizing financial institutions, and removing restrictions on 
foreign financial transactions. Financial liberalization has both a domestic and foreign dimension. 
Moreover, it focuses on introducing or strengthening the price mechanism in the market, as well as 
improving the conditions for market competition.  
 
In the literature several arguments in favor of financial sector liberalization have been put 
forward. Most of these arguments take the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that markets 
are most efficient in allocating scarce resources. The discussion on liberalizing financial markets 
more or less started with the seminal publications of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). They 
both argued in favor of liberalizing financial markets on the grounds that this would both lead to 
more efficient allocation of investment which, in turn, would lead to higher economic growth 
rates. In the 1990s, when the role of financial institutions in economic growth became intensively 
                                                 
1 For the definition see WTO Document, TN/S/W/43. 
2 See www.fin.gc.ca/hst/hstglo-e.html 
3 See www.alwarrantysolution.com/glossary.htm   9
discussed in the literature, several authors explicitly modeled the relationship between finance and 
growth, while others focused on investigating the empirical support for these models.  
 
First, it is claimed that freeing entry and competition in financial markets increases interest 
rates on deposits, which leads to higher saving rates. This, in turn, increases the amount of 
resources available for investment (McKinnon 1973). If financial liberalization also opens up the 
foreign capital account, capital inflows may increase, again raising the availability of funds for 
investment and growth. Second, competition puts pressure on profit margins, in particular on 
lending rates. This reduces the cost of capital, leading to a rise in investment and growth. 
Moreover, financial liberalization contributes to increased possibilities of risk diversification by 
financial institutions such as banks. This also reduces the cost at which loans are offered. Third, if 
markets are liberalized, financial intermediaries are stimulated to become more efficient by 
reducing overhead costs, improving overall bank and risk management, and increasing the supply 
of new financial instruments and services. Moreover, if financial liberalization means opening up 
domestic markets to foreign competition, this may lead to the import of bank and risk management 
techniques, as well as of new financial instruments and services. All these effects will help to 
improve the efficiency of financial intermediation in a country, contributing to higher returns to 
investment and thus to higher rates of economic growth.  
In parallel, there is also a view that financial liberalization may pose new risks. Stiglitz 
(2000) and others point out that financial liberalization as such does not solve the problem of 
asymmetric information. This may prevent financial intermediation from becoming more efficient 
in a liberalized market. Similarly, Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1996, 1997, 2000) in a series 
of articles make the point that liberalization reduces the franchise value of banks, which makes 
them more prone to financial disruption and stimulates risk taking in order to try to increase profits 
under the pressure of falling interest rate margins. Reduced margins may also stimulate banks to 
economize on screening and monitoring efforts, and they may be more willing to opt for a 
gambling strategy when allocating loans, i.e., putting less emphasis on risk and more on profit.  
 
The impact studies on financial service liberalization (mostly banking and insurance) 
generally look into three aspects viz., stability of the financial system and growth, competition and 
efficiency, as well as access to credit and financial services. Laeven (2003) in a recent study finds 
evidence for the hypothesis that financial liberalization reduces financial constraints of firms. 
Similarly, positive effects of financial liberalization on reducing financial constraints are found, 
among others, by Koo and Shin (2004) for Korea, Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) for 
Indonesia, Guncavdi, Bleaney and McKay (1998) for Turkey, and Gelos and Werner (2002) for 
Mexico. Nazmi (2005) in case of five Latin American countries finds evidence that deregulation of 
financial markets increases investment and growth. Clarke et al. (2001b) find that the foreign 
banks tend to be more efficient and profitable than their domestic competitors (Clarke et al. 
2001b). Claessens et al. (2001) find econometric evidence that “foreign bank entry can render 
national banking markets more competitive, and thereby can force domestic banks to start 
operating more efficiently” (Claessens et al. 2001). In particular, they find that the larger the share 
of foreign banks in the domestic banking market, the lower the profitability and the lower the 
operating costs of domestic banks.  
 
Some studies using cross-country panel data to investigate the quality effect of financial 
liberalization find supportive evidence that financial liberalization spurs productivity growth   10
(Bonfiglioli, 2005). Levine (2001) focuses on the effects of international financial liberalization on 
the efficiency of domestic financial markets and growth. Levine finds evidence for the fact that 
liberalization improves the efficiency of stock markets, since it increases the liquidity of these 
markets. Moreover, foreign bank entry improves the efficiency of domestic banks. Both these 
effects in turn help to increase economic growth. The internationalization or liberalization of 
financial markets matters for financial development as well as for productivity growth. First, the 
main direct positive effect of foreign banks on the level of financial development is to improve the 
access to financial services and lower the cost of borrowing, and at same time, it will also improve 
the quality of banking services. Second, foreign bank entry also has the indirect effect of 
increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the domestic banking sector, and providing 
incentives to improve accounting, auditing, and rating institutions, as well as encouraging learning 
by doing by local banks (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Through entry and exit, new banks bring new 
knowledge, more varieties /products and innovative processes to the market and force-out some 
inefficient domestic banks. Productivity improves through resources reallocation from inefficient 
banks to more efficient ones. Consumers and firms in non-financial sectors benefit from more 
efficient banking services and better products. In an study, Tornell, Westerman and Martinez 
(2004) present supportive evidence for the idea that financial liberalization in the short term leads 
to financial fragility, but in the longer term contributes positively to economic growth.  
 
Asian countries, while having experienced rapid financial deepening in the recent years, 
continue to limit, in varying degrees, the penetration of domestic banking markets by foreign 
firms. But Claessens and Glaessner (1998) show that net interest margins are lower, overhead 
costs are lower, and profits are higher in Asian banking systems that are more open to foreign 
bank participation (Claessens and Glaessner, 1998). The same study concludes that “the limited 
openness to date has been costly in terms of slower institutional development, greater fragility and 
higher costs of financial services”.  
 
Studies by Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996) on Ecuador and Hermes and Lensink 
(1998) on Chile, however, find much less supportive evidence for the positive effect of financial 
liberalization on reducing financial constraints. There is also growing evidence that if foreign 
participation merely substitutes for domestic factors and the sector does not expand, i.e. the degree 
of competition remains unchanged, then there cannot be a positive growth impact on account of 
the scale effect. But the net effect is said to depend on the extent of technology transfer. A study 
by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1999) indicates that the impact is linked to factor and 
productivity impact (Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1999). In this respect an intensive study by 
Matto, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001) finds that despite employment effect being 
ambiguous, the productivity of national factors will unambiguously increase due to liberalization 
of a service sector that requires local presence. Liberalization will lead, first, to an increase in the 
aggregate scale of the sector and, secondly, to technology spillovers from the local presence of 
foreign factors. Both effects will enhance the productivity of the nationally owned factors. Taking 
the employment and productivity effects together the study concludes that the effect of 
liberalization on GNP is ambiguous (Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian, 2001). A study by 
Clarke et al. (2001a) concludes that the orientation of foreign banks toward serving larger 
companies may worsen the access to credit of small and medium-size companies (SMEs). This 
outcome would be all the more likely if competitive pressure from foreign bank entry were to 
crowd out smaller domestic banks that are the principal lenders to SMEs in the developing 
countries (Clarke et al. 2001a).  
   11
The major conclusion to be derived based on various studies is that the better outcome and 
impact critically depends on domestic reforms to underpin the viability and credibility of the 
financial sector liberalization. If increased entry into financial sectors is not accompanied by 
adequate prudential supervision, instability may result. And the absence of well-designed universal 
service requirements may result in new, unsustainable burdens being imposed on vulnerable 
groups of the society.  
 
Although some studies have attempted to examine the role and impact of financial 
liberalization in Nepal (Acharya 2003, UNDP 2004, Khanal and Kanel 2005 and Khanal et. al. 
2005), they lack rigorous comparative analysis of state owned, private sector owned and joint 
venture bank and insurance companies. Such a study is important from the standpoint of assessing 
the strengths and weaknesses of ongoing financial sector liberalization and finding out the suitable 
course of banking and insurance sector liberalization.   
1.4 Research Question(s) and Scope of Study  
1.4.1 Research Question 
 
The most important research questions addressed by the study are as follows: 
 
1.  How have banking and insurance sector liberalization policies been pursued in Nepal? Are 
these reforms accompanied by the strengthening of rules, regulations and the regulatory 
system itself? 
2.  Has banking and insurance sector liberalization enhanced competition and efficiency to 
promote business?  
3.  Is there any adverse employment effect of increased foreign equity participation? Is it 
adversely affecting the process of gender mainstreaming?  
4.  What lessons could countries like Nepal learn from the ongoing liberalization of banking 
and insurance sectors in order to be useful for internal policy reforms as well as 
international preferential trade negotiations?  
1.4.2 Scope of the Study 
 
The scope of the study is as follows: 
 
–  Briefly assess the liberalization policies perused in the banking and insurance sector 
especially since 1990s,  
 
–  Examine the strengths and weaknesses of the banking and insurance sector liberalization in 
the light of their contribution to raising efficiency and competitiveness, 
 
–  Make a comparative assessment of the roles of joint venture, private and government 
owned banks and insurance companies in promoting business and enhancing access to 
credit with special focus on the gender dimension, and 
 
–  Explore the possibility of enhancing the role of banking and insurance services in the 
Nepalese economy and map out the strategies to be appropriate in preferential trade 
agreements made by LDC’s such as Nepal.    12
1.5 Methodology and Data  
 
There has been a flourishing body of empirical work aiming at testing the positive 
relationship between financial development and economic growth.
4  Generally, these studies are 
based on regression analysis for large cross-sections of countries. The basic equation tested has the 
following form: 
 
yi = β0 + β1FDi + β2Xi + εi 
 
where, yi is the rate of growth of country i, FDi is an indicator of financial depth, Xi is a set 
of control variables, and εi is the error term. 
 
Several indicators of financial depth have been proposed in the literature. Initially, the 
indicators were based on monetary aggregates, such as M1 and M2. However, these may be a poor 
proxy for financial development, since they are more related to the ability of the financial system 
to provide transaction services than to the ability to channel funds from savers to borrowers. 
Indeed, economies with underdeveloped financial systems may have a high ratio of money to 
GDP, as money is used as a store of value in the absence of other more attractive alternatives. 
Consequently, researchers have shifted from narrower monetary measures (M1 and M2) to broader 
definitions, such as M3, which is generally referred to as liquid liabilities of the banking system. 
Although M3 overcomes some shortcomings associated with M1 and M2, it still contains M2 and 
therefore may be influenced by factors other than financial depth. More recently, credit to the 
private sector has been favored as an alternative measure of financial intermediation. The main 
advantage of this indicator is that, by excluding credit to the public sector, it measures more 
accurately the role of financial intermediaries in channeling funds to the private sector. Although it 
may be still a poor indicator where stock and bond markets are well developed, in countries like 
Nepal this could be a better proxy to represent financial deepening or development.  
 
Some studies also attempt to construct a composite index for use in the cross-country 
regression analysis. Firstly, indices of openness are constructed. Attention is given to capture the 
two key elements that contribute to dynamic benefits ofservices liberalization — the degree of 
competition and the extent of foreign ownership. In view of regulation playing a crucial role in 
delivering competition, a third element is also included. In the absence of measurement or data 
problems, some studies include openness to cross-border trade to represent the nature of regulation 
(Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian 2001).  
  
In recent years attempts have also been made to improve the methodology that could help 
analyse the impact of financial liberalization more robustly. Some alternative methods  for 
assessing the degree of competition and efficiency are suggested in the literature. For this, interest 
rate spreads and margins are generally used as proxy variables. A number of recent papers have 
explored the relationship between foreign bank entry, market structure and interest rate spreads 
and margins (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Barajas, Steiner and Salazar, 2000; 
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004) and find a positive relationship between foreign bank 
entry and intermediation efficiency. Similar approach has been followed by a recent study to 
                                                 
4 Some of the most important empirical works include King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997 and 2003), Khan and Senhadji 
(2002), Herms and Lensink (2005) and Bayraktar and Wang 2006).   13
explore the effect of bank privatization and foreign bank entry on intermediation efficiency 
(measured by interest margin and spreads) in the Ugandan banking system (Beck and Heiko, 
2006). A World Bank study also follows almost the similar approach to examine the competition 
and efficiency issues in the course of finding relationship between banking sector openness and 
growth (Bayraktar and Wang, 2006).  Some studies also emphasis on the necessity of examining 
the factor impact in terms of employment and access to credit facilities. 
 
  Taking all these into account, this study adopts a three pronged approach. An analytical 
approach has been followed to examine the features of banking and insurance sector liberalization. 
In the course of analysis, various indices like financial deepening, spread between lending and 
deposit rates, rate of return, access to financial services, autonomy of the monetary authority, and 
extent of prudential  regulation have been examined. The restrictions on private investors, 
including foreign investors, open ing new banks through rules, regulations and other measures has 
also been examined. Interest margin, profits before tax, and overhead costs of government owned, 
private domestic and joint venture banks are assessed.      
 
This is followed by  regression analysis to examine the relationship between financial 
deepening and economic growth. During the course of the model estimation, various control 
variables were also included and tested. Since time series annualized data for the period of 1981 to 
2005 were used for the model estimation, unit root tests were also carried out to check for non-
stationary characteristic in the series.  
 
Finally, a case study of three banks is undertaken. Net interest margin, non-interest income, 
overhead costs, non performing loans, credit to the private sector etc., have been examined. One of 
each institution -  government owned, domestically private sector owned, and joint venture - has 
been randomly selected to make a comparative study. The role of the liberalized banking system in 
enhancing gender mainstreaming has also been looked into by examining the employment pattern 
in three banks.  
 
Both secondary and primary data sources have been utilized for the study. Major data 
sources for the study include Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Banking and Financial Statistics, 
Annual Monetary Policy Statements and Annual Report of the Central Bank. For detailed 
Commercial Bank information, annual reports of the concerned banks have been used. Likewise, 
Economic Surveys of the Ministry of Finance, National Accounts and other statistics of the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and Annul Reports of the Insurance Board and Insurance Companies 
have been the sources of data and information. Earlier studies, reports, government policy 
announcements, government commitment to the WTO, SAFTA and BIMSTEC related documents 
were also used for the study. For the case study structured questionnaires were developed and 
concerned authorities were interviewed. 
1.6 Structure of the Report   
The next chapter briefly reviews the performance of the economy in the pre- and post 
liberalization period. This is followed by a critical review of the policy reforms carried out in the 
banking and insurance sectors. In Chapter 4, Nepal's commitments under WTO, SAFTA and 
BIMSTEC are  briefly reviewed. Chapter 5 presents five case studies of three banks. Chapter 6 
derives conclusions and policy implications.     
  
   14
 
II: A Brief Review of the Nepalese Economy   
2.1 Growth Performance 
 
There is a marked increase in the rate of growth in the non agricultural sector between the 
pre-and post liberalization periods. During the second half of 1980s when the structural adjustment 
program was implemented, GDP grew at a rate of 4.6 per cent on average, comprising of 4.1 per 
cent in agriculture and 5.0 per cent in non-agricultural sectors.   In the first five years of intensive 
liberalization, the average growth was 4.9 percent despite negative growth in the agriculture 
sector, the non-agricultural sector recording a high growth rate of 10 per cent (Table 2.1). The 
growth in electricity and manufacturing was particularly high. A rapid expansion in private sector 
activities also took place in trade, transport, finance and real estate in the aftermath of market-
oriented reforms. However, such a growth momentum could not continue for long due to 
worsening security situation and triggering of political instability in the country which started from 
the mid-1990s. The political instability also had some adverse effect on ongoing reforms in 
banking and other sectors. Studies show that adverse pre-conditions and wrong sequencing also 
had some negative effect on the performance of various sectors of the economy (Khanal et al. 
2005). As a consequence, the growth rate decelerated sharply during the period 2000 to 2005. The 
adverse effect was particularly severe in the manufacturing and trade sectors. Some deceleration in 
the growth rate took place in the finance and real estate sectors as well. The fluctuating trend in the 
growth rate had adverse effects on the speed of structural change in the economy.    
Table 2.1 
   Sectoral Growth Rates, 1980 – 2005 (per cent)  
           
  









Agriculture 4.1  -0.2  2.8  2.8 
Mining  4.2 7.9 3.4 1.6 
Manufacturing 5.4  13.0  5.6  -1.3 
Electricity 8.6  23.0  9.0  7.9 
Construction  5.4 8.5 4.6 1.8 
Trade    4.9 6.6 6.1  -1.4 
Transport    3.6 7.5 9.2 4.6 
Finance & Real 
Estate    5.1  5.8  6.4  3.7 
Community and  
Social  Services  3.0 7.3 6.1 3.0 
Non-Agriculture 5.0  10.0  6.3  2.5 
GDP  4.6 4.9 4.5 2.7 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues), Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 
 
 
During the period 1985 to 1990 only marginal changes in the structure of the economy 
took place (Table 2.2). The contribution of agriculture in the total GDP fell to 50.6 per cent in 
1990 from 51.2 per cent in 1985. Correspondingly, a minor change occurred within the non-
agriculture sector. The manufacturing sector's contribution increased to 6 per cent from 5.7 per   15
cent during the same period. A similar pattern is observed in the trade and construction sectors. 
During the initial years of the intensive reforms, structural shifts were very rapid. Share of 
agriculture in total GDP dropped by almost ten percentage point during the period 1990 to 1995. 
There was a big surge in the contribution of the manufacturing sector as its ratio reached 9.3 
percent from 6 percent in 1990. Some increase in the contribution of construction, trade, transport, 
community and personal services sectors also took place during this period. Better export 
opportunities enjoyed by the export-oriented industries until the mid-1990s had very positive 
effect on the structural shift. This momentum could not be maintained for long. After 1995, the 
shift away from agriculture toward non-agriculture was not only negligible, even the shift within 
the non-agriculture sector was not as expected. The share of the manufacturing sector continuously 
dropped, reaching 7.7 per cent in 2005. A similar pattern persisted in the trade sector. The share of 
finance and real estate  reached 11.5 percent in 2005 from about 9 percent in 1985.  
      Table 2.2  
Sectoral Shares in GDP (per cent) 
   
S.N.  Descriptions  1985   1990   1995   2000    2005 
1  Agriculture  51.21 50.62 40.75 39.62 38.21 
2  Mining  0.43 0.45 0.53 0.49 0.49 
3  Manufacturing  5.65 5.97 9.31 9.16 7.72 
4  Electric  0.41 0.52 1.36 1.62 2.33 
5  Const  8.46  8.96 10.99 10.20 10.40 
6  Trade    10.26 10.53 11.58 11.71  9.86 
7  Transport    6.02 5.74 6.66 8.01 9.57 
8 
Finance  & Real 
Estate    8.97  9.29  9.77  10.08  11.46 
9  Com Soc Ser  8.55  7.88  9.01  9.08  9.91 
10 
Non Agriculture 
GDP  48.78 49.37 59.24 60.37 61.78 
11  Agriculture  GDP  51.21 50.62 40.75 39.62 38.21 
12 
Total GDP at 
factor  cost  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues), Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 
 
The broad industrial categories give clearer picture on the changing structure of the 
economy (Table 2.3).  The share of services sector was 43.13 percent in 1985. Its share reached 
54.06 percent in 2005. Unlike the variability in manufacturing, there has been steady expansion of 
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Table 2.3 
Industry Shares in GDP (per cent) 
   
S.N.  Descriptions  1985   1990   1995   2000    2005 
1  Agriculture  51.22 50.63 40.75 39.63 38.21 
2 
Industry 
(Manufacturing)  5.65 5.97 9.31 9.16 7.72 
3  Services  43.13 43.40 49.93 51.21 54.06 
4 Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues), Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal 
 
  Along with the liberalization of the economy, a big shift in the employment structure took 
place (Table 2.3). In 1981 as much as 91.1 percent of the active population was engaged in 
agriculture and related activities. This ratio gradually decreased to 81.2 percent in 1991. Changes 
in ecomployment structure were phenomenal during the period 1991 to 2001. During this period 
employment in the agriculture sector went to 65.7 percent. This became possible particularly due 
to high rates of absorption of the economically active population by the manufacturing and trade 
sectors. By 1991 employment in these sectors increased by 2.1 and 3.5 percent respectively, and 
by 2001 they absorbed 9 and 9.9 per cent of the economically active population. A gradual 
expansion in the level of employment also took place in  finance and real estate. In 1981 only 0.1 
percent of the economically active population was engaged in this sector. The contribution of this 
sector to total employment reached 0.8 percent in 2001.   
 
Table 2.4  













Total  6,850,886 100.0 7339586 100.0  9900198 100.0 
Agriculture.  6,244,289 91.1 5961788 81.2 6504689 65.7 
Mining and 
manufacturing  971  0.0 152418 2.1 888301 9.0 
Electricity, gas 
and water  33029  0.5 11734 0.2  148218  1.5 
Construction  3013  0.0 35658 0.5  286418  2.9 
Commerce  2022  0.0 256012 3.5 984662 9.9 
Transport and 




7424  0.1 20847 0.3 76687 0.8 
Personal & 
comm. services  9850 0.1  752019  10.2  663737  6.7 
Others  313570 4.6 28004 0.4  163412  1.7 
Industry not 
stated  127272 1.9 70298 1.0 22395 0.2 
Source: CBS. Various Population Censuses.            17
 
III: Financial Structure and Policy Reforms in the Banking and 
Insurance Sector 
3.1 Structure of the Financial System 
 
Before liberalization, the financial system consisted of only two commercial banks and few 
other financial institutions.  By 2005, NRB licensed bank and non-bank financial institutions 
totaled 181. Out of them, 17 were commercial banks, 26 were development banks and 60 were 
finance companies.  The remaining 78 were micro credit development banks, saving and credit 
cooperatives, and NGOs performing limited banking activities (Table 3.1). The other non-deposit 
taking financial institutions include 21 insurance companies, one Employee Provident Fund, one 
Citizen Investment Trust, one Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation, one Nepal 
Stock Exchange Limited, one Credit Information Bureau, 116 postal saving offices and one Rural 
Self-Reliance Fund. Of these institutions, the commercial banks, development banks, finance 
companies, financial cooperatives and NGOs are under the regulatory framework of Nepal Rastra 
Bank (NRB). While the Insurance Board regulates the insurance companies and the Securities 
Soard regulates the stock exchange, the other institutions are under the overall regulation of the 
Government.  
Table 3.1  
Growth of Financial Institutions 
            Source: Banking and Finance Statistics, NRB, 2005 
In terms of ownership structure of the banks, 6 are joint venture banks and 11 are fully 
domestic owned banks. Out of these, Rastria Banijaya Bank is fully government owned, and Nepal 
Bank Ltd. is government and private sector owned with 42 percent share still held by the 























Commercial Banks  2  3 5 10  13  17 
Development Banks  2  2 2 3 7 26 
Finance Companies  -  - - 21  45  60 
Micro Credit Development 
Banks  -  - - 4 7 11 
Saving and Credit 
Cooperatives  -  - - 6 19  20 
NGOs (Performing limited 
Banking activities)  -  - - - 7 47 
Total  4  5 7 44  98  18
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Table 3.2  
Commercial Banks and Their Ownership Pattern as of Mid-July 2005 











Government Owned Banks      
Nepal Bank Ltd  380.4  Government-42% 
Private-58% 
 
Rastriya Banijya Bank  1172.3  Government –100%   
Private Owned Banks      
Nepal Investment Bank Ltd.  587.7  Nepalese-100%   
Bank of Kathmandu Ltd.  463.6  Nepalese-100%   
Nepal Credit & Commerce Bank 
Ltd 
693.6 Nepalese-100%   
Nepal Industrial & Commercial 
Bank Ltd. 
500.0 Nepalese-100%   
Lumbani Bank Ltd.  500.0  Nepalese-100%   
Machhapuchere Bank Ltd.  550.0  Nepalese-100%   
Kumari Bank Ltd  500.0  Nepalese-100%   
Laxmi Bank Ltd.  610.0  Nepalese-100%   
Siddratha Bank Ltd.  350.0  Nepalese-100%   
Joint Venture Banks      



































Total 9423.2     
Source: Bank and Financial Institution Department, NRB. 
  
  Out of the 21 insurance companies , 14 are in the private sector, 3 are the branches of 
foreign insurance companies, other 3 are joint venture companies and the remaining one is a 
government owned company. Sixteen are in general insurance, 3 are in life insurance and 2 are 
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Table 3.3 
Ownership Structure of Insurance as of Mid-July 2005 
Ownership  Nature of the Companies  Total 
  General Life Composite  
Government 
Owned 
- -  1  1 
Private Sector  13  1  -  14 
Foreign   2  1  -  3 
Joint Venture  1  1  1  3 
Total 16  3  2  21 
     Source: News and Views, Nepal Insurance Board, 2006.    
 
The total financial assets of the financial system  reached Rs 474325.9 million in Mid July 
2005, representing 90 per cent of GDP. The share of financial assets in GDP was only 29 and 32 
per cent in 1985 and 1990 respectively. Similarly, the ratio of deposits to GDP went to 47.7 per 
cent in 2005 from 10 per cent in 1980 and to 32 per cent in 2000. The credit to GDP ratio reached 
30.9 percent in 2005 showing somewhat slow growth in comparison.  
 
Figure 1 
Growth of Assets, Deposits and Loans (per 
 
 
Although in terms of market share commercial banks dominate the financial system, a 
rapid change in share has taken place (Table 3.4). In 2000 the asset share of commercial banks was 
92.9 per cent. Their asset share reduced to 86.7 per cent over five years period, the expansion 
being taken by development banks and finance companies whose share increased to 19.4 per cent 
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Table 3.4  
Market Shares of Financial Institutions (Rs million) 








    2000  2005 2000 2005  2000 2005 
Commercial  Banks  209539.3 411240.56 155027.1 252294.3 96296.4 163689.1 
Development Banks  1578.8  23241.96  166  6818.76  748.9  19232.94 
Finance Companies  13082.1  30356.85  9793  22445.1  9094.7  21323.48 
Micro-credit Development 
Banks  - 6166.24  - 852.35  -  3344.86 
Others (Cooperative and 
NGOs)  1353.3 3320.2 995.8  1704.69  856  1463.38 
Total  225553.5 474325.81 165981.9 284115.2  106996 209053.7 
Share in Total                   
Commercial  Banks  92.90  86.70 93.40 88.80  90.00 78.30 
Development  Banks  0.70  4.90 0.10 2.40  0.70 9.20 
Finance Companies  5.80  6.40  5.90  7.90  8.50  10.20 
Micro-credit Development 
Banks  -  1.30 -  0.30 -  1.60 
Others (Cooperative and 
NGOs)  0.60  0.70 0.60 0.60  0.80 0.70 
Source: Annual Banking Statistics, Nepal Rastra Bank, 2006 
 
A big change in market share is also taking place within the banking system. In 2000 the asset share of the two government 
owned banks was 56.6 percent.  It reduced to 38.1 percent in 2005. The decline in the credit share has been sharper, from 56.7 percent 
in 2000 to 29.4 percent in 2005. On the other hand, the shares of the private domestic banks in assets, deposits and credit has risen to 
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Table 3.5  
Total Assets, Deposits and Credit in the Banking System  (Rs million)                                                                                    














Bank  103834.20  103867.16 73989.60 78950.22  52004.30 43568.66  0.70  0.55 
Private Owned 
Domestic Banks  15010.00 66433.54 13161.60 57470.28 9583.90 47413.88  0.72  0.82 
Joint Venture 
Banks  64500.60  102357.41 53485.20 89613.75  30146.40 57085.11  0.56  0.63 
Total   183344.80 272658.11 140636.40 226034.25 91734.60 148067.65  0.65  0.65 




Bank  56.63 38.09 52.61 34.93  56.69 29.42         
Private Owned 
Domestic Banks  8.19 24.37  9.36 25.43  10.45 32.02         
Joint Venture 
Banks  35.18 37.54 38.03 39.65  32.86 38.55         
Total   100 100 100 100  100 100         
Source: Bank and Financial Institution Department, NRB.   22
3.2 Policy Reforms in Banking   
 
3.2.1 General Policy Reforms 
 
Prior to liberalization in the mid 1980s, Nepal's financial system was characterized by 
interest rate controls, controls on entry and exit, and selective credit policies. Intermediation costs 
were very high due to lack of competition and inefficiency. There were only two commercial 
banks, and two specialized financial institutions—the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal 
(ADB/N) and the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), all controlled and regulated 
by the Government. 
 
In 1984, controls on interest rates were gradually lifted. Commercial banks and financial 
institutions were allowed to fix deposit rates above the floor rate fixed by the Nepal Rastra Bank 
(NRB). By 1989 decontrolling of interest rate was completed. In 1984, joint venture banks were 
also allowed to operate. As a result, three joint venture banks came into operation during the 
period 1984 to 1987. Similarly, the Finance Companies Act was brought into effect in 1985 to 
meet the rising demand of small borrowers. Removal of the statutory liquidity ratio and 
introduction of auctioning of Treasury Bills were other reform measures implemented during the 
1980s. From 1989, NRB also began to fix capital adequacy ratio. In the same year, NRB also set 
an upper limit on the amount of loan to be provided to a single borrower or group of borrowers by 
a bank with the aim of minimizing the risk of over-concentration of loans in few big borrowers.  
Banks were instructed to provide a maximum of 50 percent of capital fund with respect to funded 
loan and 100 percent of capital fund with respect to non-fund based loans for a single borrower.  
Similarly, in 1990 the Central Bank introduced open market operations as one of the tools of 
monetary policy.  
 
However, these limited reforms were far from adequate in enhancing efficiency, and a 
more intensive reform was started from early 1990s. The Finance Company Act 1985 was 
amended allowing promoters to hold 60 percent of the total issued capital. The Development Bank 
Act 1995 and Financial Intermediary Institutions Act 1998 were introduced to attract private sector 
and NGOs in establishing financial institutions in the rural areas. In response, a large number of 
development banks, some of them  replicas of Grameen Bank, and financial NGOs and 
cooperatives came into operation during the post-reform period. Prudential norms were also 
gradually defined and strengthened. The capital adequacy ratio was increased in 2005 to 12 
percent from 9 percent. In 1995 the limit on the amount of loan to a single and group borrower 
was reduced to 35 percent and 50 percent, respectively. Through the regulation 2001, the loan 
limits were further revised; 25 percent of core capital in case of fund based loans and 50 percent of 
core capital in case of non-fund based loans. Along with the changes in the basis from capital fund 
to core capital, the credit limit also went down drastically over time. The NRB also issued 
directives to the banks to monitor the sectoral concentration pattern of credit. 
 
The mandatory priority sector lending policy was introduced in Nepal as early as 1974. 
Paradoxically, in the post-liberalization period this policy was kept intact and the level and forms 
of priority sector lending were increased. The ratio of priority sector lending was raised to 12 per 
cent in 1990 from 8 percent in 1985. In 1992, commercial banks were additionally directed to lend 
a certain percent of priority sector lending toward the small borrowers of deprived sectors. Only in   23
a recent policy announcement has the Central Bank committed to phase out priority sector lending 
by 2007.  
 
In the 1990’s the Central Bank was ambivalent towards the issued of liberalization. On the 
one hand it was argued that restriction on entry would lead to oligopolistic practices and suppress 
competition. On the other it was thought that liberal entry into financial services could generate 
unhealthy competition (NRB, 1996). Therefore, the regulatory authorities adopted a discouraging 
and delaying policy mainly through the capital base route.  
 
In 2002 some notable steps were taken to bring institutional reforms in the banking system. 
Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002 and Debt Recovery Act 2002 with provisions of Debt Recovery 
Tribunal were introduced. The Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002 provides autonomy to the Central 
Bank. It also gave sufficient authority to NRB to maintain financial discipline and perform its 
regulatory and supervisory role more effectively.  
 
However,  these reforms were ineffective in raising the financial health of the banking 
system in general and government owned banks in particular. The slow speed or wrong forms of 
implementation were  equally responsible for this (UNDP, 2004 and Khanal et al, 2005). As a 
result, the financial system entered into crisis. A study conducted by the World Bank (2002) 
revealed a number of weaknesses in the financial system. Some of the major deficiencies 
highlighted by the study were: 1) excessive government involvement in the banking system, 2) 
weak corporate governance and organizational culture, 3) poor lending practices, 4) fragmented 
legal framework, 5) inadequate disclosure, accounting and auditing standards, 6) high level of 
non-performing loans and political intervention. A separate study by KPMG found two state 
owned commercial banks technically insolvent. With the emergence of the new and modern banks, 
the older state-owned banks with wide rural networks had to compete with banks mostly operating 
in the urban areas.  A phenomenon of 'cream skimming' appeared in the banking services with 
lucrative and easy business such as export financing and donor transactions appropriated by the 
new private sector banks (World Bank 2002). 
 
A comprehensive ' Financial Sector Reform Program' with the support of the World Bank 
and other donors was introduced in 2002. This reform program is now underway. The program 
aims to create a competitive, market friendly, well diversified and prudently managed system. The 
major components of the program are three: i) re-engineering of the NRB, ii) restructuring of state 
owned banks viz., RBB and NBL, and iii) capacity building in the financial sector. 
 
    In the beginning the focus of reform was on the improvement in the legislation and 
prudential norms in the financial sector. The enactment of New NRB Act 2002 and steps to 
enforce better prudential regulation are outcome of this. As a part of the ongoing reform, two 
commercial banks were contracted out to the foreigners. Very recently the Banking and Financial 
Act 2006 (an umbrella Act covering all financial institutions) has been enacted with the aim of 
bringing more reform to the financial system in a more coordinated way.  
  
 3.2.2 Some Specific Policy Measures    
 
General Provisions: Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 has given full authority to the Nepal Rastra 
Bank regarding regulation, inspection and supervision of the banks and financial institutions. Bank 
and Financial Institution Act governs the functional aspect of banks and financial institutions. The   24
NRB classifies the institutions into "A" "B" "C" "D" categories on the basis of minimum paid-up 
capital and provides a license to the bank or financial institution. The license holder entity must 
maintain a capital fund according to ratio prescribed by NRB, based on its total risk weighted 
assets. The license holder entity must contribute a fixed percentage of its profit to general reserve 
every year until the amount is twice the paid up capital of the entity.  
 
Establishment and Classification: For the establishment of any bank or financial institution in 
Nepal, each bank should get a license from Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB). For this purpose the NRB 
has classified the institutions into "A" "B" "C" "D" groups on the basis of the minimum paid-up 
capital (Table 3.6).  
 
Table 3.6 
Minimum Capital Requirement (Rs million) 
             
Minimum Capital Requirement  Category 
National level  Regional 
level 
A 1000  320 
B 320  - 
C  150 ( for institutions conducting leasing and finance activities) 
100 (for the institutions not conducting leasing and finance activities) 
- 
D 100  10 
Source: Licensing Policy for Commercial Banks, 2006, Nepal Rastra Bank 
 
To establish a new commercial bank at national level, the paid up capital of such bank 
must be at least Rs. 1000 million. Those banks that are in operation or those who have obtained 
letter of intent before the enforcement of these provisions have to bring up their capital level to Rs 
1 billion by 16 July 2009. In order to increase the capital level, profit must be at least 10 percent of 
the paid up capital.  
 
Rules on Ownership:  At least 51 per cent ownership has to be occupied by the promoters for   
establishing any bank and financial institution. Likewise, a 30 per cent share of total paid up 
capital has to be allocated to the general public.  
 
Rules on Location: For operating banking all over the country, the paid up capital must be Rs. 1 
billion. To operate a bank outside Kathmandu Valley, the paid up capital must be Rs. 320 million.   
Legal Provisions for the Establishment of Joint Venture Bank: For establishing a Joint Venture 
Bank, share capital of the foreign partner bank should be at least 20 per cent. The upper limit has 
now been raised to 75 per cent of the total paid up capital. In addition, if the ratio of paid up 
capital of foreign partner is less than 50 per cent, at least 30 per cent shares have to be issued to 
the general public.  
 
Provisions for Establishing Foreign Bank's Subsidiaries and Branches: A foreign bank or 
financial institution desiring to open its office within Nepal has to receive permission from the 
NRB. The NRB may specify necessary terms and conditions while granting transaction license. 
However, a joint venture bank cannot open another bank or financial institution on a joint venture 
basis. Additional contacts or representative office may be established with the permission of the 
Nepal Rastra Bank. 
   25
Branching: A new commercial bank with a head office in Kathmandu may initially open a branch 
in the Valley. Only after some interval is it permitted to open other branches in the Valley and 
outside. For existing commercial banks, they can open branches anywhere in the country after 
getting approval from the NRB.  
 
Scope of Business: In order to promote the trust of the public in the overall banking and financial 
system, protect and promote the rights and interests of depositors and provide quality banking and 
financial intermediary services through healthy competition, the Bank and Financial Act 2006 has 
been brought into effect. It aims to promote healthy business and strengthen prudential regulation.   
 
Rules on Employment: There are no specific rules and regulations for domestic banks on 
employment. Normally, commercial banks prepare their staff by-law covering issues related to 
personnel management. In case of Joint Venture Banks, they have to make separate Technical 
Service Agreement on number and responsibilities of expatriates.  
 
Prudential Regulation: The main responsibility of the NRB is to strengthen prudential regulation 
in the banking system. As a supervisor, the NRB reviews and inspects functioning of financial 
institutions through, among others, on-site inspections, off-site inspections and special inspections. 
NRB recently has issued a set of sixteen unified directives for all bank and financial institutions 
for ensuring corporate governance, consolidating financial situation, improving the people’s 
confidence and enhancing stability of the financial system. The directives related to prudential 
regulation include: (i) Maintenance of capital adequacy, (ii) Loan classification & loan loss 
provisioning, (iii) Limit of credit exposure and facilities to single borrower, group of related 
borrowers and single sector of the economy, (iv) Accounting policies and formats of financial 
statements, (v) Minimization of risk, (vi) Corporate governance, (vii) Time-frame for 
implementation of regulatory directives issued in connection with inspection & supervision of the 
banks, (viii) Investment in  shares & securities, (ix) Statistical reporting by commercial banks to 
NRB and (x) Sale and transfer of  promoters share (xi) Provision related with Consortium 
financing (xii) Provision for blacklisting (xiii) Maintenance of Cash reserve ratio (xiv) Provisions 
for bank branches (xv) Provisions relating interest rate and (xvi) Provisions related with financial 
resource collection. 
3.3 Policy Reforms in Insurance 
 
Nepal is now engaged in amending laws, rules and regulations related to the insurance 
sector. Free entry to the foreign insurance services providers has required amendments to existing 
rules for creating a  more competitive environment in the domestic market. Changes in the existing 
rules are also needed to fulfill WTO obligations. Some of the major reforms carried out in various 
interrelated areas include the following.  
 
Classification Systems: The Insurance Act, 1992 and Insurance Regulation, 1993 govern the 
insurance business in Nepal. They guarantee equal treatment to national as well as foreign 
insurance companies.  
 
Establishment: The Insurance Act, 1992 and Insurance Regulation, 1993 provide guidelines for 
establishing insurance companies in Nepal. The main provisions of the Act and Regulations are: 
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–  No one shall engage in or make arrangement for engaging in insurance business without 
obtaining a license under the Act, 
–  No individual or institutions within Nepal shall conduct transaction relating to insurance 
business with any individual or institutions other than the insurer who have obtained 
registration certificate under the Act, 
–  Any national or foreign corporate body desirous to operate Insurance business shall submit 
an application to the office of the Insurance Board in the prescribed form along with the 
documents like Memorandum and Articles of association of the corporate body, policies 
and terms and conditions of the insurance business to be operated, documents displaying 
calculations of premium in case of life insurance business, documents regarding the 
methods of utilizing the fund etc., and 
–  The total liability to be assumed should not be in excess of total assets. 
 
The Act does not restrict  the pattern of ownership, location of business inside the country and 
the legal forms (e.g. subsidiaries vs branches vs joint venture). In case of foreign joint venture, 20 
per cent of the share has to be issued to the general public. However, the insurer is not allowed to 
operate life insurance and non-life insurance business side by side through the same organization. 
The paid up capital should be at least Rs. 250 million for the life insurance business and Rs. 100 
million for the non-life insurance business. There is provision in the Insurance Act, 1992 that the 
Insurance Board may cancel the registration of an insurance company if the head office of the 
insurance business of any foreign insurer is situated out side Nepal, and in case it is felt that 
Nepalese insurer has not obtained equal facilities while operating in the foreign countries as 
enjoyed by the foreign insurer pursuant to the prevailing law of such a country. The foreign 
corporate body also has to show evidence that it has adequate assets inside Nepal so as to bear the 
total liability of his/her insurance business in Nepal. 
 
Operations: The insurer may operate life insurance business under (a) whole life insurance (b) 
endowment life insurance and (c) term life insurance. Under the non-life insurance business, the 
insurer may operate (a) fire insurance, (b) motor insurance, (c) marine insurance, (d) engineering 
and contractors risk insurance, (e) aviation insurance and (f) miscellaneous insurance. The insurer 
may re-insure the risks which are in excess from the risks assumed by it. There is no specific rule 
on board membership of insurers regarding the experience and qualification. There is no special 
law other than the Insurance Act, 1992 and Insurance Regulation 1993 regarding the insurance 
business in Nepal.  The foreign investor making an investment in foreign currency shall be entitled 
to repatriate share of equity, profit or dividend, and also principal and interest on foreign loan. 
 
Prudential Regulation: Prior to the enactment of Insurance Act 1968, insurance business in 
Nepal was regulated by the commercial Act and hence there was no system of supervision over 
insurance companies. Only in 1968 Beema Sammiti (Insurance Board) was established under 
Insurance Act 1968. In the Insurance Act 1992 and Insurance Regulation 1993 there are number of 
specific provisions related to prudential regulations. Some of the important provisions include:  
–  The insurer should maintain separate insurance fund for each category of insurance 
business and should not utilize it to bear the liabilities relating to other categories of 
insurance business. 
–  Every Insurer should maintain a reserve fund which must contain:   
o  In case of life insurance business an amount not less than total liability as specified 
by the actuary on the basis of the insurance policies issued by the insurer within 
Nepal,     27
o  An amount not less than 50 per cent of the net non-life insurance premiums, 
o  50 per cent of the profits earned, until the amount equals the insurers paid up 
capital, and                                                                                                                             
o  An amount equal to 115 per cent of outstanding claims set for the expiry of each                      
financial year                                                                                                          
–  The Insurance Board has also set investment norms. The insurance companies are required 
to invest at least 75 per cent of their total investment in government securities, treasury 
bills and banks’ fixed time deposits. The remaining 25 per cent can be invested in housing 
schemes, finance companies, and debenture schemes of public limited companies apart 
from deposits in the commercial banks. 
–  An insurer may only assume the risk once the premium has been paid by the policy holder. 
–  Onsite and offsite inspection of companies has to be made by the Insurance Board. 
–  The insurer shall have to reinsure the risk exceeding their limit in the manner specified by 
the board. 
–  Valuation has to be made by an actuary. 
–  Loan, guarantee and security should not to be provided to the directors. 
3.4 Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Prior to the mid 1980s an overvalued fixed exchange rate policy was pursued. This was a 
part of the inward looking import substitution industrial policy. The aim of such a deliberate 
policy was to make imports cheaper compared to exports. With severe foreign exchange crisis 
from the beginning of 1980s, a major devaluation of the Nepalese currency was made in 1985. 
Exchange rate was further devalued in the early 1990s along with the liberalization drive. The 
liberalization of the exchange rate gained momentum after India introduced partial convertibility 
of the current account in 1993. As Nepal could not afford to keep her foreign exchange regime 
different from that of India due to structural reasons, partial convertibility was introduced 
immediately after India. In the same year Nepal accepted the Article VIII of the IMF and fully 
liberalized the current account. Today Nepal's exchange rate with hard currencies is market 
determined. However, exchange rate with India is still fixed. Nepal is, thus, following two sets of 
policies regarding the exchange rate - one for the Indian currency and another for the convertible 
currencies. The major concern of such a dual exchange rate policy is that it becomes extremely 
difficult to maintain autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy. As an offshoot, the fixed 
exchange rate regime undermines the prices and balance of payment goals of monetary policy. 
Although flexible exchange rate system with India may encourage speculation and thereby capital 
flight in the short run, the misalignment of prices are eroding competitiveness of the Nepalese 
trade and industry (Khanal and Kanel, 2005). Thus the dual exchange rate system is not 
compatible with the ongoing reforms in the economy in general, and the financial sector in 
particular.     28
 IV: Commitments under GATS, SAFTA and BIMSTECS  
4.1 Commitments under GATS on Trade in Services  
4.1.1 General Commitments   
 
Under WTO, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides a framework 
within which liberalization commitments in the area of services, including financial services, are 
to be undertaken and implemented. Part I (Article I) of the Agreement defines the scope and 
coverage of the GATS. The agreement applies to measures by WTO members, which affects trade 
in services. Article I sets out a comprehensive definition of trade in services in terms of four 
different modes of supply: cross-border (i.e., tele-banking), consumption abroad, commercial 
presence (i.e., a bank or insurance company established with foreign equity in Nepal), and 
presence of natural persons (i.e., a foreigner works in a financial institution in Nepal).
 Part II sets 
out "general obligations and disciplines". These are basic rules which apply to all members and, 
for the most part, to all services.  
 
Nepal made a number of commitments to liberalize its services sector, including a 
commitment that supply of services from an existing foreign supplier will not be made more 
restrictive than they exist at the time of Nepal’s accession to WTO. No limitation has been placed 
in respect to consumption abroad. However, there is a limit of foreign exchange of up to US dollar 
2000 for a Nepalese citizen going abroad. Movements of natural person are restricted,  except in 
the categories of sales persons, persons responsible for setting up a commercial presence, and 
intra-corporate transferees.  
 
In respect to commercial presence, no limitation on national treatment has been placed on 
foreign investments and reinvestments. But two preconditions have been imposed. The first is that 
both of these will require approval by the Department of Industry. The second is that any 
incentives and subsidies provided willl be available wholly to Nepalese owned enterprises. In 
respect to the presence of natural person, it has been made unbound or restrictive except as 
specified in the natural person category for market access. The schedule also restricts foreigners 
from dealing in real estate in Nepal. The present civil code prohibits selling, mortgaging, gifting or 
endowing or disposing real estate to foreigners. Nonetheless, Nepal is committed to make 
decisions on the application for investment in Nepal within 30 days, except in the case of project 
requiring environmental impact assessment (EIA). In this context, it has been clarified that 
normally such investments will not be withheld except in case of failure to meet environmental 
standards. This is a wide-ranging commitmen,t and reflects Nepal's commitment to open up 
Nepalese economy for foreign investment. In case of repatriation of investment in foreign 
currency, the following facilities have been committed: 
 
–  Amount received by the sale, in whole or part, of the investors’ share of equity. 
–  Amount received as profit or dividend as a result of an equity investment, 
–  Amount received as the payment of the principal of and interest on any foreign loan, 
–  Amount received under an agreement to transfer technology approved by the DOI or 
Department of Cottage and Small Industries. 
 
Since these commitments/conditions will apply to all cases, these have been categorized as general 
commitments.   29
 
4.1.2 Specific Commitments in Banking and Finance  
 
Nepal has accepted general conditions in accordance with the GATS and its Annex on 
financial services. All the commitments are subject to entry requirements, domestic laws, rules and 
regulations and the terms and conditions of the Nepal Rastra Bank and any other competent 
authority in Nepal, as the case may be, which are consistent with Article VI of the GATS and 
paragraph 2 of the Annex on financial services. Financial services in the form of operations 
identified in the schedule can be carried out in Nepal only through a locally incorporated 
company. Branches will be allowed for wholesale banking as of 1 January 2010. Only a licensed 
commercial bank, a licensed specialized bank or a registered finance company may accept 
deposits, which are repayable upon demand. Only financial institutions with rating of at least ‘B’ 
by Credit Rating Agency e.g. MOODI (Standard and Poor) ca n have acommercial presence in 
Nepal. The total foreign shareholding in any institution providing financial service is limited to 67 
percent of the issued share capital. The share held by foreign nationals and foreign financial 
institutions in their locally incorporated companies are not transferable without the prior written 
approval of the Nepal Rastra Bank or any other competent authority as the case may be. 
Representative office may not be engaged in a commercial business. The members of the Board of 
Directors of a financial services supplier will be in proportion to equity representation of that 
financial services supplier. 
 
The specified banking and financial services have been restricted for market access 
purpose except for (k) and (l) (Table 4.1). Commercial presence has been opened up for market 
access except as indicated in general conditions. For derivative products under sub sector (f) and 
settlement of and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivatives products 
and other negotiable instruments under (j) have been restricted  until Nepal government 
determines what types of entities can conduct these services, the related laws and regulations are 
established and such business is authorized by the government or other designated authority. In the 
issue of national treatment, all three modes of supply, cross-border supply, consumption abroad 
and commercial presence, no restrictions have been placed except as specified in general 
conditions and horizontal section. In respect to presence of natural persons, it has been restricted 
both for market access and national treatment purposes.  30
Table 4.1 
GATs Commitment in Banking and Finance 
2.  Banking and Other Financial Services 
(a)  Acceptance of deposits 
and other repayable funds 
from the public 
 
(I)  Unbound, except for (k) 
provision and transfer of 
financial information, and 
financial data processing and 
related software by suppliers 
of other financial services and 
(l) advisory services on all the 
activities listed above were 
none 
(II)  Unbound, except for (k) 
provision and transfer of 
financial information, and 
financial data processing and 
related software by suppliers 
of other financial services and 
(l) advisory services on all the 
activities listed above were 
none 
(III)  None, except as indicated in 
general conditions.  
  For derivative products under 
sub-sector ‘f’ and settlement 
of and clearing services for 
financial assets, including 
securities, derivative 
products, and other 
negotiable instruments under 
‘j’ unbound until HMG/Nepal 
determines what types of 
entities can conduct these 
services, the related laws and 
regulations are established 
and such business is 
authorised by the government 















(3)   None, except as specified in 
the general conditions and 
horizontal section 
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(b)  Lending of all types, 
including, inter-alia, consumer 
credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring and financing of 
commercial transactions. 
(c) Financial  leasing 
(d)  All payment and money 
transmission services 
(e)  Guarantees and commitments 
(f)  Trading for own account or 
for account of customers, 
whether on an exchange, an 
over-the-counter market or 
otherwise, the following: 
 -  money-market 
instruments (cheques, 
bills, certificates of 
deposits, etc.) 
 -  foreign  exchange 
 -  derivative  products 
including, but not 
limited to, futures and 
options 
  -  exchange rate and 
interest rate instruments, 
other than swap. 
 -  transferable  securities 





(g)  Participation in issues of all 
kinds of securities, including 
under-writing and placement 
as agent (whether publicly or 
privately) and provision of 
service – related to such 
issues. 
 
(h)    Money broking 
(4)  Unbound, except as specified 
in the horizontal section. 
(4)  Unbound, except as indicated 
in horizontal section. 
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(i)    Asset management, such as 
cash or portfolio management, 
all forms of collective 
investment management, 
pension fund management, 
custodial depository and trust 
services. 
(j)    Settlement of and clearing 
services for financial assets, 
including securities, derivative 
products, and other negotiable 
instruments 
(k)  Provision and transfer of 
financial information, and 
financial data processing and 
related software by providers 
of other financial services. 
(l)  Advisory services on all the 
activities listed above   33
4.1.3 Specific Commitments in Insurance  
 
  Table 4.2 summarizes Nepal's commitments on insurance services. It is clear from the table 
that there is no restriction on market access in mode 2 and 3 except for free re-insurance and 
retrocession. Mode 1 and 2, however, intend that mandatory reinsurance up to USD 25000 must be 
placed with domestic insurance company until 31, December 2007. Mode 3 is unbound until 31 
December 2007 and mode 4 supply is fully unbound. With respect to the limitations on national 
treatment, Nepal has committed to none for mode 1, 2 and 3. For mode 4, it is unbound. Thus, Nepal 
has made no restrictions on cross–border (Mode 1) and consumption abroad (Mode 2) modes of 
supply in life and non life insurance services. 
 
Table 4.2   










Direct  Insurance     
Life -  None 
-  None 










-  None 
-  None 










Non-life -  None 
-  None 










-  None 
-  None 


















to USD 25,000 








indicated in the 
horizontal 
section 
























-  None 
-  None 









-  None 
-  None 
-  None 






Source: Nepal Specific Commitment in Services, WTO.  
 
4.2 Regional Commitments 
 
4.2.1 SAFTA  
 
In a major effort to promote regional trade, leaders of the SAARC member countries finalized 
the agreement on free trade area (SAFTA) at Islamabad SAARC Summit in 2004. Its objectives as 
stated in the preamble of the agreement are, “to strengthen intra-SAARC economic cooperation to 
maximize the realization of the region’s potential for trade and development for the benefit of their 
people, in a spirit of mutual accommodation, with full respect for the principles of sovereign 
equality, independence and territorial integrity of all states.” The SAFTA Committee of Experts 
(COE), set up to resolve outstanding issues, has carried out strenuous negotiations and held 12 
meetings to reach the final decision. The 12
th meeting of the COE that ended in Kathmandu on 2 
December 2005 took the final decision and cleared the way for enactment of SAFTA accord by 
January 1, 2006.  
 
The SAFTA among others covers tariff rules of origin, safeguards, institutional structures, and 
dispute settlement issues. It also calls for the necessity of adopting various trade facilitation 
measures such as harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of test results, harmonization of 
customs procedures, and cooperation in improving transport infrastructure.  
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Services, including financial services are not yet the subject matter of SAFTA. However, 
realizing the importance of services trade, SAARC member countries have recently made a 
decision to include services within the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) framework. 
The Ministerial Council Meeting of SAFTA, held in Dhaka in April 2006, has assigned the 
Committee of Experts (CoE) to explore the possibilities. In a bid to expedite that process, the 
Ministerial Council has also constituted a study group to look into the possibility of including trade 
in services within the SAFTA framework.  
 
4.2.2 BIMSTEC  
 
The idea of regional co-operation was first mooted by Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand at a meeting in Bangkok in June 1997. At the Ministerial meeting in February 2004, 
Nepal also became its new member. This inter-regional grouping is supposed to serve as a bridge 
between the five SAARC countries (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan) and two 
ASEAN countries (Myanmar and Thailand). At the first Ministerial Meeting of the BIMSTEC held 
in Bangkok on 7 August 1998, it was decided that BIMST-EC would initially begin co-operation 
in six areas viz. trade and investment, technology, transportation and communication, energy, 
tourism, and fisheries. Realizing the areas specified very broad, from the standpoint of enhancing 
efficiency and fulfilling the objectives laid-down in the BIMSTEC, the six sectors have been 
further divided into various sub-sectors. The financial services are not yet the part of this regional 
agreement. Nepal’s financial services liberalization therefore, will be least affected by the 
BIMSTEC in the immediate future.  
4.3 Actual Implementation Status of WTO Commitments  
 
The commitments under GATS are predominantly related to market access and national 
treatment in specifically designated sectors. To identify the required changes in rules and policies 
and to make them compatible with the WTO commitments, Nepal Rastra Bank had established a 
High Level Committee (HLC) on May 12, 2003 (NRB, 2006).  The HLC commissioned a study on 
foreign bank branches in Nepal. Similarly, Multilateral Trade Integration and Human Development 
in Nepal, a project jointly initiated by the government of Nepal and United Nations Development 
Programme, had also commissioned a study to find out the gaps in services sector 
regulations/rules. Some of the suggestions have already been incorporated in the new Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act 2006.  
 
Interestingly, Nepal has liberalized banking and insurance sectors beyond the commitments 
made in the WTO. At present, foreign investors are allowed to invest up to 75 per cent of total 
equity, in all types of financial institutions, which is more than the commitments of Nepal (67 per 
cent) at WTO. Similarly, Nepal Rastra Bank has prepared a report outlining the framework to 
allow foreign banks to open and operate their branches in Nepal, as per the commitments at WTO. 
In recent monetary policy (NRB 2006), the Central Bank has indicated that it will allow foreign 
bank branches (wholesale banking) to operate in Nepal by 2010. For this, a process of developing 
required infrastructure has been initiated by the Nepal Rastra Bank. In order to enhance the 
competitiveness of the banks, the Central Bank has also fixed a schedule of raising the amount of 
paid up capital by these banks. The insurance sector has also been liberalized beyond the limits set 
in the WTO commitments. Apart from allowing branches  foreign insurance companies, 100 per 
cent equity participation is now been allowed.  
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 V: Performance of Banking and Insurance Sectors  
 
In this chapter the performance of the banking sector over the pre and post liberalization 
periods is examined by reference to key indicators like net profit, ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans and interest rate spreads. Competition and efficiency issues are assessed by calculating 
various performance indices as suggested by Beck and Heiko (2006) and Bayraktar and Wang 
(2006). The role and importance of banks in augmenting growth, expanding credit and generating 
employment are also examined using regression and trend analysis of time series data. Insurance 
sector performance has been assessed separately by examining the pattern of insurance premiums 
and lending.      
5.1 Performance and Efficiency of the Commercial Banks    
 
5.1.1 Net Profit, NPA and Interest Spreads 
 
Table 5.1 shows net profit, the ratio of NPA to total loans, and the interest spread of 
government owned, private domestic owned and joint venture banks for the years 1990, 1995, 
2000 and 2005. By examining the profitability of the three types of banks, it is found that, except 
in the case of one bank, the profitability of the joint venture banks has substantially increased over 
time. A  similar pattern is observed in the domestic private sector banks. However, in the case of 
government owned banks non-performing loans in the total loan portfolio (reaching above 60 
percent in both banks in 2003), caused a major losses. It was only after contracting out of these 
banks as a part of overall financial sector reform, could these banks make a net profit. Financial 
sector liberalization has been associated with continuous reduction in interest rate spreads for all 
banks and positive net profits. Thus, the Nepalese experience indicates that increased competition 
backed by institutional and structural reforms are keys to improving performance of the banking 
system. It is also clear from the Nepalese experience that even in a liberalized environment only 
severe crises or shocks compel broad based reforms in government banks. Additional indices 



















Table 5.1  
Net Profit, NPA and Interest Spreads of Commercial Banks by Ownership Type 
 
   Net Profit (Rs in million)  NPA/Total Loan (per cent)  Interest Spread (per cent) 
    1990  1995 2000 2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Government Owned Banks 
NBL 9.1  78.5 
-
2697.80  1730.13  0.88  2.0   48.20 49.64  9.49  6.87  6.1  4.38 
RBB 
-
37.7  25.4 -1791.5  1322.89 12.2  7.6 38.29  52.99  10.71 5.45  4.2 4.67 
Private Domestic Banks  
NIB  53.5 61.4  72.6  232.1  2.09  1.7  8.79 2.69  13.18  9.2  4.78  3.74 
BOK     -7.9  70.7  139.53     0  3.3  4.99     1.6  5.7  4.21 
NCCB        5.6  -5.16        7.2  8.64        6.85  3.69 
LUMB        0.3  -196.77        1.6  15.23        4.6  4.31 
NICB        24.2  113.76        1.14  3.78        5.08  3.68 
MB           84.87           0.39           3.56 
KB           87.88           0.95           3.68 
LAXB           26.46           1.63           2.97 
SB           70.28           2.58           3.32 
Joint Venture Banks 
NABIL  28.2  164.4  329.1 518.64  1.79  0.5  6.3 1.32 9.11  8.2  7  5.36 
SCB  37.9  151.1 392.6 539.2  -  1.2  3.71  2.69  5.84  8.9  7.46  4.53 
HB     69  199.38  325.22     1.9  1.49  7.44     9.4  7.12  3.53 
SBI     7.3  50  57.38     1.5  1.4  6.54     5.9  4.5  3.36 
NBB     -5  139.53  -749.54     1.01  1.44  19.04     3.78  6.78  2.76 
EB     -3.9  41.3  170.8     0.1  2.99  1.63     11  4.16  4.29 
Source: Annual Reports of Banks   38
 
5.1.2 Interest Margin, Overhead to Total Assets and Profit before Tax   
 
Net interest margin, profits before tax, and overhead costs have been calculated for three 
types of banks with different ownership structures. For comparisons purposes, the estimates are 
made for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 (Table 5.2).  It is generally expected that as  these 
variables drop, the efficiency of banks increases, indicating a higher level of competition. The net 
interest margin is defined as the ratio of net interest income to total assets. The net interest margin to 
total earning assets has also been  calculated for comparison of the two ratios more specifically. The 
interest margin showing the difference between earnings from interest and expenses on interest is an 
important indicator of competitiveness, since as a banking sector gets more competitive, the lending 
rate is expected to drop, but the deposit rate is expected to increase. The share of pre=tax profits in 
total assets is another efficiency indicator. In closed and imperfectly competitive banking sectors, the 
profit rate has to be higher. In such sectors, banks pay low interest rates for funds, and also charge 
higher interest rates on loans. They also require high service fees. At the practical level, this is not 
the case in state run banks where overhead costs due to number of reasons remain high. For this 
reason, the ratio of overhead costs to total assets is separately reported.  
 
Table 5.2 
Net Interest Margin, Overhead to Total Assets and Profit before 
Tax to Total Assets in the Banking System 
  (per cent)  
Net Interest Margin to Total Assets   1990 1995 2000 2005 
Government  Owned  Banks  1.06 2.07 1.00 2.50 
Private  Owned  Domestic  Banks  7.04 5.27 2.80 3.32 
Joint  Venture  Banks  2.27 3.72 3.28 3.65 
Interest Margin to Total Earning Assets             
Government  Owned  Banks  1.70 3.58 1.86 5.26 
Private  Owned  Domestic  Banks  9.46 8.00 3.49 3.84 
Joint  Venture  Banks  3.76 4.77 3.79 4.09 
Overhead to Total Assets Ratio             
Government  Owned  Banks  2.29 1.82 2.67 3.17 
Private  Owned  Domestic  Banks  4.76 3.26 1.83 1.76 
Joint  Venture  Banks  2.80 2.37 1.67 2.07 
Profit Before Tax to Total Assets             





Private  Owned  Bank  7.06 3.57 1.68  1.  60 
Joint  Venture  Commercial  Bank  3.32 3.23 2.72 2.76 
Source: Annual Report of Various Banks 
 
In the case of government owned banks the margins steadily increased from the low margin 
in 1990 to reach about 2.1 percent in 1995. After this, the margin reduced considerably up to 2000. 
With the beginning of reforms in 2002, it again started increasing to reach 2.5 percent in 2005. On 
the other hand, a sharp fall in the interest margin to total assets is found in private domestic banks. 
The trend is almost stable in the joint venture banks. The ratio is relatively low through out the 
period under consideration. When interest margin to total earning assets is analyzed, a slightly a 
different but expected trend is observed. With the beginning of reforms, interest margin to total 
earnings  increased considerably in the government owned banks. The difference between the two 
ratios indicates that total assets of these banks still posses high share of non-earning assets. With 
the increased competition, such a ratio in the private domestic banks fell considerably over time. A   39
stable trend is observed in the joint venture banks. One interesting phenomenon is that there is a 
small gap in the two ratios in the private banks indicating efficiency enhancement in these banks. 
This is further corroborated by the overhead to total assets ratios in the three types of banks under 
consideration. No reduction in the overhead cost is found in the government banks. However, cost 
effectiveness is noteworthy in the private domestic banks. In the government owned banks profit 
before tax has now become positive after very high losses in 2000. In the private banks, the profit 
before tax to total assets has steadily decreased. Thus, our trend analysis supports the view that 
bank-specific characteristics play a big role in the performance of the banks. Overall, our findings 
suggest that both structural impediments and market structures are critically important in driving 
bank efficiency. In other words, Nepalese experience indicates that government control and 
regulation is antithetical to improving the performance and enhancing efficiency in the banking 
system. One implication is that liberalization  without simultaneous emphasis on changes in 
ownership and market structure will be less helpful in improving performance of the overall 
banking system. The inability of state owned banks to restructure and diversify lending portfolios 
in the competitive market prevents them ] covering the marginal cost of funds plus the 
intermediation costs. Compulsion to make higher loan loss provisions for non-performing loans 
with limited earning assets remaining in the portfolio leads to crisis in the state owned banks.  
5.2 Financial Deepening and Economic Growth: A Regression Analysis  
 
5.2.1 Estimation Procedures and Time Series Properties of the Variables 
 
There is growing evidence that macroeconomic time series variables are generally non-
stationary in nature. As a consequence, the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using these 
data may produce spurious results. In other words, non-stationary time series could produce highly 
significant nonsense correlation between variables. In order to avoid such problems the integrating 
properties of the variables should be examined by testing for the existence of unit roots in variables 
under consideration. 
 
Unit root tests are used to check for non-stationary characteristics in a series. There are 
several ways of testing for the presence of a unit root. Three most popular tests are Dickey-Fuller 
(DF), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the newly formulated Phillips-Perron (PP) tests.  
Since it is widely believed that both DF and ADF tests do not consider the cases of 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality frequently revealed in raw data of economic time series 
variables, the PP test for unit root has been used in the empirical analysis. Moreover, it has an 
advantage over the ADF test when the concerned time series has serial correlation and there is a 
structural break. Consequently, the PP test provides robust estimates over the DF and ADF tests 
and is based on the following form of equation: 
 
∆Zt = Ø + (ρ-1)Zt-1 + γ(t-T/2) + Ψ∆Zt-i + ε3t 
 
The appropriate critical values of the t-statistic for the null hypothesis of non-stationairty 
are given by MacKinnon (1991). 
 
The estimation process begins with the testing of variables for unit root to determine 
whether these can be considered as stationary or non-stationary processes. The results of PP tests 
on both level form and first difference (with trend) are reported below.  The results indicate that 
the variables considered for the model estimation do not possess serious non-stationarity problem 
(Annex 1).    
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5.2.2 Estimated Model and Model Results  
 
For examining the linkage between financial deepening and economic growth, attempts 
were made to test a neoclassical growth type model. The model was specified and estimated by 
relating the growth rate of real GDP to financial depth indicator (private sector credit to GDP 
ratio), investment to GDP ratio, growth rate of population, initial real per capita GDP to capture 
the level of development, financial sector performance index and total trade to GDP ratio. 
However, investment to GDP ratio, population growth rate, financial sector performance index
5 
and openness variables were found insignificant and dropped. To capture the openness and extent 
of liberalization, a liberalization dummy
6 was included in the model. Thus, the estimated equation 
in the log form is as follows: 
 
LOG ((GGDP)) = 89.91108836 + 1.549032249*LOG ((PSC/GDP)) + 0.4146176768*LD  
        (4.31)      (3.55)             (1.58) 
       -  11.30535863*LOG  ((PCI  (-1))) 
- (4.25)     
 
Where, 
GGDP=Growth rate of GDP 
PSC/GDP = Private Sector Credit to GDP Ratio 
LD= Liberalization Dummy (0 before 1991 and 1 for 1991 and onward)  
PCI= Per Capita Income  
   
R
2=.58;     Adjusted R
2=.51;     DW=2.08;      F-statistic=8.72 
 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses. The model has a good fit with relatively better 
explanatory power.  DW is at the neighborhood of 2. All the variables except liberalization dummy 
are highly significant. The liberalization dummy is significant at 13 percent level of significance.  
 
The estimated model provides interesting results in many respects. Our results show a 
strong link between financial development and economic growth in the Nepalese context.  As the 
results indicate, one percent increase in private sector credit would lead to about 1.5 percent 
growth in GDP. Similarly, liberalization dummy exerts influence on the growth to some extent. 
The coefficient on the log of initial income is negative and highly significant suggesting that 
conditional convergence holds, corroborating the large body of literature
7. The results also suggest 
that credit to the private sector is the better measurement of financial development or financial 
intermediation. Despite financial crisis in the state owned banks due to predominance of non-
performing loans, big expansion in banking institutions and their lending portfolios contributed to 
enhance growth in Nepal.  
 
                                                 
5 In view of predominance of two state banks in the assets and other portfolios of the commercial banks during the period under 
consideration, the index was found to be insignificant. At the same time, the private sector credit variable might have swamped 
the effect if any.  
6 The equations were estimated without this variable also. But only with the liberalization dummy variable model had good 
fitness. It partly represents the effect of liberalization as 1 is used for the liberalization period and zero for the period before 
intensive liberalization. Thus, this partly reflects the effect of shift as well.  
7 Conditional convergence implies that countries that are far from steady equilibrium (which is the case fro developing countries) 
tend to grow faster than countries that are closer to their steady states (developed countries) See for example Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil ( 1992) for a test of the convergence hypothesis and  also see Senhadji and Khan (2002).     41
5.3 Lending Pattern of Commercial Banks and Access to Credit 
 
Due to non-comparability of series, lending status of the commercial banks for the year 
1990, 1995 and 2000 and 2003, 2004 and 2005 is separately given (Table 5.3 and 5.4). The level of 
commercial bank credit shows that there has been phenomenal expansion in credit. In 1990 the 
level was Rs 11.8 billion. The level reached Rs. 164 billion in 2005 and thus during the fifteen 
years period there was an almost 14 fold increase in credit. The lending pattern shows that the 
largest beneficiary of credit expansion has been the industrial sector. Of  total commercial bank 
credit in 1990, the share of the industrial sector was 32.3 percent. Its share went up to 49.2 percent 
in 2000. The second highest beneficiary of the credit expansion has been the commercial sector. 
The share of the commercial sector rose to 32 percent from 28.5 percent during the same period. 
The new classification also shows that after 2000, the major beneficiaries have been production 
and wholesale and retail trading sectors. Conversely, the major losers have been agriculture and 
social sectors. The new classification based credit pattern shows even more downward credit flow 
to the agriculture sector. The lending pattern corroborates the view that the private domestic and 
joint venture banks concentrate more on lucrative business in urban areas. A mutually inclusive 
pattern between the commercial bank lending and growth is revealed by the relevant data. As 
reported in the chapter two, in the liberalized regime, the non-agriculture sector, mainly services, 
has been the major contributory to the changed economic structure in Nepal.  42 
  
 
Table 5.3  
Lending Portfolio of the Commercial Banks (1990, 1995 and 2000) 






















1990  1531.6  12.9 3817.6  32.3 3371.7  28.5 2785.3  23.6 292.5  2.4  11798.7 
1995  4923.8  12.1 15877.6  39.1 13305.7  32.7 4785.5  11.7 1697.7  4.1  40590.3 
2000 8863.7 8.9  44885.3  45.1  32753.3  32.9  7237.9  7.2  5713.6  5.7 99453.8 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Years), Ministry of Finance. 
 
Table 5.4 
Lending Portfolio of the Commercial Banks* (2003. 2004 and 2005) 
Year/sector 2003  Share  2004 Share  2005 Share 
Agriculture    3734.5  3.1  4901.9  3.6  4415.5  2.7 
Mines 399.4  0.3  336.6  0.2  5203  3.2 
Production 42910.5  35.5  47181.5  34.4  53744.2  32.8 
Construction 2729.2  2.3  4986.7  3.6  8723  5.3 
Metal, productions, machinery and 
electrical tools and fittings  1430.1  1.2  1450.7  1.1  1797.5  1.1 
Transportation, equipment, production and 
fittings 1359.8  1.1  2776.7  2.0  3156.3  1.9 
Communication and public services  6523.4  5.4  7963.6  5.8  8997.2  5.5 
Wholesalers and retailers  27555.3  22.8  31728.9  23.1  34412.7  21.0 
Finance, insurance and fixed assets  4250.3  3.5  4857  3.5  6391  3.9 
Service industries  12212.5  10.1  14216.9  10.4  14984.8  9.1 
Consumable 3364.6  2.8  4400  3.2  3588  2.2 
Local government  1.5  0.0  2.3  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Others 14283.5  11.8  12278.1  9.0  18592.6  11.3 
Total  120754.6 100.0  137080.9 100.0  164005.9 100.0 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Years), Ministry of Finance. 
* From 2002/03 new classification has been adopted and hence it is not comparable with previous years.    43
 
Realizing that access to credit or financial services among the rural farmers or small 
borrowers has been increasingly becoming a major problem, priority to establish and operate 
wholesale banking and micro credit institutions has been given by the Central Bank in recent years. 
Apart from rural development banks, the Agricultural Development Bank is engaged in providing 
loans to small and marginal farmers. Despite  these efforts, access to credit in the rural areas remains 
a major problem. After more than a three fold increase in per capita credit of the commercial banks 
in less than a decade, access of credit to the lower income strata and poor people has not improved 
commensurately. Living standard surveys of 1995/96 and 2003/04 show that borrowing households 
(from both the formal and informal financial system) have increased from 61 percent in 1996 to 69 
percent in 2004. Of the borrowing households, only 15 per cent borrowed from the banking system 
in 2004 compared with 16 per cent in 1996 (Table 5.5). This implies that the proportion of 
households with access to bank credit has risen only marginally from less than 10 per cent in 1996 to 
just 10.4 percent in 2004. Money lenders and relatives account for more than 80 percent of the 
borrowing. The poor have to resort to such sources. Only 8.3 per cent of the poorest consumption 
quintile had access to bank credit in 2004, almost the same as in 1996.  
 
The collateral based lending practice of the banks has been a factor denying access of the 
poor in bank credit. Although free of collateral based lending has increased considerably overtime 
from 12 percent in 1996 to 28 percent in 2004, it is yet to encompass most poor and vulnerable 
group of the society. Besides, the lower the consumption group of households, the higher has been 
the proportion of borrowing for consumption. In 2004, 58 percent of the borrowing of the poorest 
consumption quintile went on consumption. This means that these households have to meet their 
basic consumption needs by incurring debt (CBS, 1996 and 2004). The expansion in consumption 
through increased indebtedness, however, does not contribute to sustained well-being. Thus, Nepal's 
experience indicates that there are some serious structural problems persisting in the banking system. 
From the perspective of agrarian transformation, poverty reduction, and more equitable 
development, development of a rural - focused banking system as well as specialist credit 
institutions catering to small businesses would be desirable.  
 
Table 5.5  
Household Borrowing and Access to Bank Credit 
  (per cent)   
Year 1995/96  2003/04 
Household borrowings   61.3   68.8 
Borrowings from banks   16.1   15.1 
Borrowings from relatives   40.8   54.5 
Borrowings from money lenders   39.7   26 
Poorest quintile having access to bank borrowing  8.2   8.3 
Richest quintile having access to bank borrowing  21.8   26.8 




5.4 Employment Pattern in the Commercial Banks 
 
As shown in the table 5.6, a large variation in the employment of three different types of 
commercial banks is observed.   When liberalization was started, two state owned commercial banks 
were the major employers. In 1990 about fifteen thousand people were employed by these banks. At 
that time, the banks used to hire a large number of people on an ad-hoc basis on the direction of the 
Government. The rising overhead cost and huge losses by the banks was a result of this situation.   44
But with the widening losses, these banks were compelled to streamline their employment policy. 
Following the contracting out of the banks, a the number of employees was reduced. This resulted 
into sharp reduction in the level of employment in the banking system. In 2005, the employment 
number in these two banks fell  to six thousand from 14 thousand in 1990.   
When the employment pattern of the private domestic and joint venture banks is taken into 
account, a gradual expansion in bank employment is observed. The increase in the level of 
employment in the joint venture banks is much more pronounced. Nepalese experience, thus, refutes 
the notion that with the permission to the joint venture banks, there is a tendency of direct 
displacement of domestic employees by the foreign workers.  
Table 5.6 
Number of Employees in Commercial Banks 
 
Name of the banks  1991  1995  2000  2001  2005 
Government Owned Banks 
NBL  8444 6989 6272 6030 2912 
RBB    6426 6011 5809 5743 3541 
Private Domestic Banks 
NIB 48  75  98  107  356 
BoK  -  46 154 196 171 
NCC Bank   -  -  115  118  262 
Lumbini Bank  -  -  71  122  135 
NIC Bank  -  -  125  123  140 
Machhapuchre Bank  -  -  -  65  75 
Kumari Bank  -  -  -  46  141 
Laxmi Bank  -  -  -  30  108 
Siddhartha  Bank  - - - -  56 
Joint Venture Banks 
NABIL    267 338 392 331 426 
SCB    181 275 264 256 335 
Himalayan  Bank    -  141 311 359 501 
SBI  Bank  -  33 133 135 164 
NB  Bank  -  58 305 362 435 
Everest Bank   -  25  158  188  257 
Total  15366 13991 14207 14211 10005 
Source: Compiled Based on Information Published by Various Commercial Banks.  
5.5 Insurance Sector Performance 
 
  With the liberalization of the insurance sector, the role of state has been gradually limited 
to that of  facilitator. Until 2001, the government owned Rastriya Beema Sansthan (National 
Insurance Corporation) accounted for 78 percent  of the total life insurance market. The year 2001 
was very important in the history of life insurance business in Nepal. In his year, three specialist life 
insurance companies  were established in the private sector. They were the Nepal Life Insurance 
Company Ltd set up by local promoters, Life Insurance Corporation (Nepal) Ltd, a joint venture 
company between life insurance Corporation of India and Nepalese investors, and a branch of 
American Life Insurance Company (ALICO). The private sector is increasingly occupying a major 
share in the insurance business as one third of the market now is occupied by the private owned 
companies. Non-life insurance companies are also gradually expanding their activities.  
   45
  Along with increased number of insurance companies, the funds available in the form of 
paid up capital, premium collection and reserve fund has also surged. This has created new 
opportunities for the insurance companies to deploy funds in various activities. The total paid up 
capital of all the insurance companies working in Nepal (excluding the paid up capital of branches of 
foreign insurance companies) stood at Rs 1198.1 million in 2005. Of this, the share of domestic 
insurance companies is 87.1 per cent. The remaining 12.9 per cent is with joint venture companies 
(Table 5.7). The total paid up capital (excluding the branches of foreign insurance companies) of all 
insurance companies was only Rs. 46.0 million in 1990. It went up to Rs 1198.1 million in 2005. 
Likewise, the total capital investment of foreign insurance companies was only Rs 4.0 million in 
1990. It slightly decreased and reached to Rs 1.6 million in 2001. However, after 2001, it jumped 
and stood at Rs 154.2 million in 2005. This shows the growing importance of foreign insurance 
companies in Nepal.  
                                                                            Table 5.7 
Structure of Paid-up Capital 
                                                                             (Rs million) 




1990 42 4.0  46.0  8.7 
1995 236.8  6.0  242.8  2.5 
2000 486.8  1.4  488.2  0.3 
2005 1043.9  154.2  1198.1  12.9 
Source: Compiled from Various Publications of Nepal Insurance Board.   
Note: * Includes foreign joint venture share in National Life and General Insurance Company Ltd., 
Sagarmatha Insurance Company Ltd., and Life Insurance Corporation. 
 
  Similarly, the total premiums collected in 2005 amounted to Rs 5850.0 million, constituting 
Rs 2850.0 million (48.7 per cent) on account of life insurance and Rs 3000.0 million (51.2 per cent) 
on account of non-life insurance (Table 5.8). Up to 1994, the total gross annual insurance premium  
accounted for less than 0.50 per cent of the total non agricultural GDP. However, it continued to 
increase after1995 and stood at 1.86 per cent of the non-agricultural GDP in 2005. The total 
collection of premium, which was Rs 243.9 million in 1990 also went up gradually and stood at Rs 
5850 million in 2005. Of the total premium income, premium from life insurance accounted for 34.5 
per cent, in 1990. However, in 2005, its share went up to 48 per cent and the remaining 52 per cent 
was generated from non-life sectors. 
 
Table 5.8 
Insurance Premium Income 
















1990  84.1     159.8     243.9    
1995  260.1  29.1 662.1 1001.7 922.2  252.7 
2000 494.3  10.0 1337.2  14.7 1831.5  13.4 
2005  2850  30.7 3000  16.9 5850  23.2 
    Source: Compiled from Various Publications of Nepal Insurance Board.   
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  Due to the increase in premium collection, the investible reserve fund also surged in recent 
years. The total investment of insurance sector stood at Rs 14600.0 million in 2005. In 1996 it was just 
Rs. 3067.5 million. It is noteworthy that of the total investment; more than 80 percent is kept in the 
form of fixed deposit in commercial banks. This underscores the necessity for diversification of 




Investment Portfolio of Insurance Business 
                                                                          (Rs million) 
  
 Life  Non-life 
   Fixed 
Govt. 
Security  Other   Total  Fixed 
Govt. 
Sector  Other   Total 
Grand 
Total 
1996  1227.6  765.7 39.2  2032.5  469.6  505.5 59.9 1035  3067.5 
1997  1461.2  900.5  46.8 2408.5  698.5  602  110.4 1410.9  3819.4 
1998  1737 987.1  55.9  2780  820.6  678.6  119.4  1618.6  4398.6 
1999  2864.1  783.7  3.7 3651.5 1158.5  691.7  129.5 1979.7  5631.2 
2000  3548.7  733.2  3.7 4285.6 1489.7  619.5  182.2 2291.4  6577 
2001  5014.1 703.2 3.7  5721  1898.1  530.7  192.9  2621.7  8342.7 
2002  6644.7  376.7  56 7077.4 2206.7  455.4  202.7 2864.8  9942.2 
2003  6892.7  637.3  355.7 7885.7 1820.2  423.4  212.8 2456.4 10342.1 
2004           9779           2676  12455 
2005           11700           2900  14600 
Source:  Compiled from Various Publications of Nepal Insurance Board and Economic Survey (Various Issues), Ministry of Finance.   
               
A quick look at the employment pattern indicates that there has been steady rise in employment too (Table 5.10). In 1990 employment 
opportunities provided by the insurance industry was 646, and 1350 in 2003. 
Table 5.10 








       Source: Compiled from Annual Report of Insurance Companies (Various Years).     48
VI: Banking Sector Performance: Case Studies 
 
Out of the commercial banks the Rastriya Banijya Bank, Nepal Investment Bank Limited 
and Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Limited were selected for the case study. Among these three, 
the first is fully government owned. Nepal Investment Bank Ltd. is fully domestic private investor 
owned. The last is joint venture bank with 75 percent ownership of Standard Chartered Group of 
Australia and UK.   
6.1 Performance  
6.1.1 Government Owned Bank: RBB   
 
Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB) is a fully government owned bank. It is the largest 
commercial bank in Nepal. RBB was established in January 23, 1966 under the RBB act. It 
actively undertakes government directed programs including priority sector lending programs to 
cater to  the needs of  people living in rural areas. The bank has a large deposit base with more 
than 1.2 million depositors. It has Nepal's most extensive banking network with over 114 branches. 
It spreads over all regions. With increased competition, it has also begun to provide modern 
banking facilities. After the introduction of the financial sector reform program, modernization of 
its services has been expedited. Since, January, 2003 management of the bank has been given to 
the foreign consultants. Although considerable improvement in its performance has taken place, it 
has yet not been able to overcome from  crisis. This is evident from many key performance 
indicators.    
 
Table 6.1 below shows that RBB was incurring high losses up to 2003. After 2003 the net 
profit margin began to be positive. So far it has not issued any shares as it remains  a fully  
government owned bank.  Per share loss has also started decreasing. From Rs 367.9 in 2004, it has 
reduced to Rs 341 in 2005. The bank has one percent non-redeemable preference share on issue. 
This has made it possible to provide a one percent dividend to the Government each year. The ratio 
of interest income to loans and advances is  in a declining trend. A similar trend is observed in 
deposit and lending interest rates.  The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans has also 
reduced to 52.99 per cent in 2005 from 60.15 per cent in 2003. Net worth is still highly negative at 





Table 6.1  
Selected Performance Indicators of Rastriya Banijya Bank Limited 
 
Fiscal Years  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 






2 27.63 37.69 



























Dividend (Cash & Bonus) on Paid Up Share 
Capital (%)  1 1 1  1  1   49
Cash Dividend on Paid Up Share Capital (%)  1  1  1  1  1 
Interest Income on Loan & Advance (%)  9.98  6.45  7.56  7.92  7.78 
Interest expenses on Deposit & Borrowing (%)  6.3  6  5.35  3.65  2.13 
Total Loan/Total Deposit (%)  67.14 
69.3
4 68.83  61.43  62.77 
Non Performing Loan/Total Loan (%)  48.16 
55.0
7 60.15  57.64  52.99 
Interest Rate Gap (Spread Rate)  1.6  -0.9  0.9  3.39  4.67 













Liquidity (Total cash in hand/Total Deposit) 
(%)  8.2 8.59 9.48 17.18 12.91 





45.51  -43.13 -34.12 





44.27 -41.98 -33.76 
 Source: Annual Report of RBB from FY 2000/1 to FY 2004/5 
6.1.2 Private Domestic Bank: Nepal Investment Bank LTD  
 
Nepal Investment Bank Limited (NIBL), previously Nepal Indosuez Bank Ltd, was established 
in 1986 as a joint venture bank. Initially, fifty percent of the capital was owned by Credit Agricole 
Indosuez, a subsidiary of one of the largest banking group in the world. Bankers, professionals, 
industrialists and businessmen  acquired 50 percent share of NIBL. In 2002 the share of Nepal 
Indosuez Bank Ltd was purchased by Nepali investors. After this, the bank was registered as a 
Nepal Investment Bank Ltd. Since 2002 it has widened its services in various parts of the country 
by opening bank branches. At present, it has twelve branch offices. 
 
Nepal Investment Bank Limited now occupies a competitive position in the Nepalese banking 
system. Deposits, eBanking, ATM, Loans and advances, Credit card, Safe deposit locker, Easy 
savings, Premier Banking, NTC mobile bill, Vehicle loans and Debit card are the major services 
provided by this bank. Recently, NIBL has formed a consortium of banks and financial institutions 
for issuance and acquiring of Visa products. The scheme allows members banks cardholders to use 
other banks' ATMs at a very subsidized rate. NIBL has recently launched the 'Premier Banking 
Cell' that caters to its high net worth clients and renders consultancy services in taxation, legal, 
insurance and travel tours. 
 
Table 6.2 below shows that the net profit margin of NIBL is increasine. Only in 2004 the ratio 
slightly declined. The earnings per share are also increasing every year. The earnings decrease in 
2005 is mainly due to additional bonus share issue. Dividend per share also showed a somewhat a 
declining trend in 2004 and 2005. The share of interest earnings to loans and advances has been 
around 9 per cent in all years except 2003 and 2005. Interest rates on deposits and borrowings are 
decreasing as a result of growing competition. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is 
equally low. With the exception of 2004, the spread rate is below 5 per cent. Due to higher returns, 
the net worth of the bank is increasing each year. Despite some fluctuations, liquidity or cash 
reserve ratio of the bank is also sound. The ratio of both core capital and capital fund to risk 





Selected Performance Indicators of Nepal Investment Bank Limited 
 
Fiscal Years  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Net Profit/Total Income (%)  13.68 14.54  20.12  16.71  20.26 
Earning Per Share (in Rs)  33.18  33.59  39.56  51.7  39.5 
Market Value Per Share (in Rs)  1150  760  795  940  800 
Dividend (Cash & Bonus) on Paid Up Share Capital (%)  Nil  30  20  15  12.5 
Cash Dividend on Paid Up Share Capital  (%)  Nil  Nil  20  15  12.5 
 Interest Income on Loan & Advance (%)  9.43  9.53  7.8  9.03  7.36 
Interest expenses on Deposit & Borrowing (%)  3.83  3.05  3  2.74  2.43 
Total Loan/Total Deposit (%)  57.07  65  74.74  63.68  73.33 
Non Performing Loan/Total Loan (%)  8.29  4.8  1.98  2.47  2.69 
Interest Rate Gap (Spread Rate)  4.04  4.24  4.8  5.98  3.74 
Book Net Worth (Rs in million)  469.09  523.47  638.54  729.05  1180.17 
Liquidity (Total cash in hand/Total Deposit) (%)  9.32  11.16  10.11  9.19  9.78 
Core Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (%)  13.1  14.4  7.87  7.22  8.52 
Capital Fund to Risk Weighted Assets (%)  14.1  15.9  8.81  11.18  11.58 
Interest Income (Rs in million)  229.1  258.6  421.8  663.0  769.2 
Interest Expenses (Rs in Million)  167.6  130.4  189.2  326.2  354.5 
Margin (Rs in million)  61.5  128.2  232.6  336.8  414.7 
Staff Expenses as % of Total Income   12.2  14.4  15.7  15.2  12.2 
     Source: Annual Report of NIBL from FY 2000/1 to FY 2004/5  51
 
6.1.3 Joint Venture Bank: Standard Chartered Bank Nepal LTD  
 
Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Limited has operated in Nepal since 1987. It was 
registered as a joint-venture bank. The bank today is an integral part of Standard Chartered Group. 
It has 75 per cent ownership in the bank. The remaining 25 per cent share is owned by the 
Nepalese public. The Bank enjoys the status of largest international bank currently operating in 
Nepal. It has 7 branches and 9 ATMs across Nepal. It serves its customers through a modern 
domestic branch network. With its global network, the bank serves as an international bank in 
Nepal. It is the first bank in Nepal that has implemented the Anti-Money Laundering policy. It has 
also applied the 'Know Your Customer' procedure on all customer accounts.  
 
Standard Chartered Bank is one of the best performers among the banks operating in the 
private sector. As evident from Table 6.3, net profit to total income is  increasing. Its market share 
is also one of the highest among the private banks. Payment of dividend including bonus share 
(stock dividend) and cash dividend are also increasing every year. Share of interest income to 
loans and advances is  decreasing. From around 10 in 2003, the interest share reduced to 7.43 per 
cent in 2005. One of the notable trends of SCBNL is that despite increased competition among the 
banks, its deposit rates decreased over time. This was partly due to excess liquidity and partly due 
to decline in the interest rate globally. The deregulation of interest rate on both lending and 
deposits also contributed to this. Lack of investment opportunities in productive sectors also has 
had effects on the deposit rates. Indicators like NPA ratio, net worth, margins and core capital to 
risk weighted assets indicate that its financial position is very sound. The net worth of the bank 
shows a higher return despite more than 100 percent dividend payment. The share of core capital 
and capital fund to risk weighted assets of the bank has remained above the regulatory requirement 
throughout the years under review.   
 
Table 6.3  














































Dividend (Cash & Bonus) on Paid Up Share Capital (%)  100  100  120  110  120 
Cash Dividend on Paid Up Share Capital (%)  100  100  110  110  120 






1 8.83 7.43 
Interest Income on Deposit & Borrowing (%)  2.77  1.82  1.35  1.3  1.31 











Non Performing Loan/Total Loan (%)  5.23  4.84  4.13  3.77  2.69 
Interest Rate Gap (Spread Rate)  4.65  4.19  4.11  3.76  4.53 











Liquidity (Cash Reserve Ratio) 
10.7
6  9.87 9.07 9.46 8.77 











Capital Fund to Risk Weighted Assets (%)  14  17.3 14.1 15.5 15.8  52
8 4 7 5 

































Staff Expenses as % of Total Income  8.68  8.74  8.53  8.50  9.42 
Source: Annual Report of SCBNL from FY 2000/1 to FY 2004/5 
6.1.4 A Comparative Analysis of Three Banks 
 
  A comparative evaluation of all three types of commercial banks based on the same criteria 
may not be justified. This is because, in the past, public sector banks were driven not only by profit 
motives but also by many other criteria laid down by the Government. Nonetheless, in view of 
changed culture in the post liberalization period, that all commercial banks including government 
owned banks must operate under profit motives, a comparative analysis could help delineate areas 
of weaknesses and strengths.  
 
  As evident from commonly used profitability indicators (Table 6.4), Standard Chartered 
Bank (joint venture) is a most profitable bank. Both net profit to total income and net profit to total 
assets ratio are high.  
The domestically owned private bank also has a high ratio. On the other hand, the indicators for 
the state owned bank show the worst performance up to 2003. Only in 2004 and 2005 did some 
improvement take place in the RBB after greater autonomy and restructuring.  
 
Table 6.4  
Profitability Indicators of Selected Commercial Banks  
    ( p e r   c e n t )         


























2000 (49.81) (3.19)  31.63  1.91  41.55  2.29 
2001 (223.06) (9.53)  22.21  1.10  36.61  2.19 
2002 (332.93) (15.72)  19.81  1.11  33.12  2.60 
2003 (205.43) (8.25)  30.05  1.27  33.69  2.42 
2004 27.62  1.75  25.97  1.13  33.95  2.27 
2005 37.69  1.87  29.34  1.40  34.20  2.46 
                Source: Annual Report of Commercial Banks (Various Years). 
  
Labor productivity is another measure of efficiency in  banking systems. For this purpose, a 
commonly used loan to staff ratio is calculated (Table 6.5). There is large variation between the banks 
in this ratio. The NIBL has the highest loans to staff ratio (29.4 per cent in 2005), more than four times 
that of the state owned RBB (7.3 per cent). Similarly, SCBNL had 25.1 per cent in 2005. In the two 
private banks the ratio is increasing. Although poor performance of the RBB is partly due to its 
compulsion to continue with branches in rural areas, over staffing due to political interference is the 
principal reason. Despite a large number of  voluntary retirements the ratio is far from satisfactory.  
Many non performing loans are also to blame. 







Loans to Staff Ratio 






















2000 5809  29140.6  5.0 98  2071.3  21.1  264  4957.5 18.8 
2001  5743  28424.7  4.9  107     2431.3  22.7  256  5924.1  23.1 
2002  5583  28516.0  5.1  105      2715.7   25.9  243  5787.9  23.8 
2003  5402  26608.83  4.9  254      5921.79   23.3  275  6000.16  21.8 
2004  3822  25105.68  6.6  325      7338.57  22.5  317  6693.86  21.1 
2005 3541  25835.2  7.3  356  10453.16  29.4  335  8420.87 25.1 
Source: Annual Report of Commercial Banks (Various Years) and Banking and Financial Statistics, NRB, July 2005.   54
 
Another measure of performance is the ratio of fee based income to total income. This ratio 
is presented in Table 6.6. Like other indicators, a large variation in fee based income to total income 
is found in these banks. The share of fee based income to total income is going down every year in 
the SCBNL. Despite some fluctuation, an almost similar trend is also found in the NIBL. However, 
in the case of RBB not only is the share of fee based income low, it is also constant. Diversification 
of banking products or services has led private banks to reduce the share of fee based income 
markedly. No similar efforts are found in the RBB. 
  
Table 6.6  
Ratio of Fee Based Income to Total Income 
Years SCBN  L*  RBB NIBL** 
2000 88.77  9.59  66.44 
2001 91.92  5.05  75.77 
2002 29.93  10.13  54.42 
2003 31.31  8.96  39.97 
2004 34.19  8.23  42.34 
2005 32.64  8.21  46.78 
           Source: Annual Report of Commercial Banks (Various Years) and  
              Banking and Financial Statistics, NRB, July 2005. 
Note: * Annual Report and Accounts Various Years, Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Limited. 
** Annual Report Nepal Investment Bank Ltd. Various Years. 
 
 
The respective distribution of loans by RBB, SCBNL and NIBL is presented in Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. The 
share of NIBL in the loan portfolio of the commercial banks is increasing rapidly. The growth in credit flow 
of this bank is higher than that of the SCBNL. Aggressive marketing has made this possible. The 
composition of credit flow shows that most of the banks have diverted loans towards industrial and 
commercial activities. The loans allocated to general  and social purposes have also increase markedly
8. On 
the other hand, credit flow of all these banks to the agriculture sector is very low, more so in the private 
banks. 
 
The commercial banks have been involved in micro-finance since 1974. Financing to the 'small 
sector' and priority sector is a mandatory credit requirement of the NRB and the CBs are required to invest a 
certain percentage of their credit portfolios in this sector. The banks were required to invest at least 5 per 
cent of the total deposit into the agriculture, cottage industries and services sector which was defined as the 
'small sector' effective from 1974. This was later increased to 7 per cent in 1976.  This mandatory 
requirement is still in practice and is known as the Priority Sector Credit Program (PSCP) and Deprived 
Sector Credit Program (DSCP). The PSCP has been gradually phased out and is presently at 2 percent for 
the fiscal year 2005/06. The NRB while introducing the DSCP, segregated the priority sector into two 
segments: 9 per cent for PSCP and 3 per cent for the DSCP. In this program, the banks are required to lend 
from 0.25 to 3 per cent of their total loan portfolio to the poorest. Despite these mandatory requirements, the 
banks, however, prefer to pay heavy penalties to the NRB instead of complying with NRB directives. Thus, 
despite the plethora of micro finance institutions and programs, credit allocations have been urban centered 
towards consumer lending. 
                                                 
8 The new Sectoral classification is partly responsible to show big surge in the credit flow to this sector.    55 
 
 
Table 6.7  
Distribution of Loans by Business Types: RBB 
 
Year 2001  Share  2003  Share  2005  Share 
Agricultural Sector  1149.38  4.2  1222.14  4.62  1672.60  6.2 












Services Sector  1591.11  5.9  1648.65  6.24  1908.30  7.1 
General use & Social Purpose  1814.85  6.7  1427.24  5.40  6375.70  23.6 
Total   27048.65  100  26422.86  100  27000.90  100 
Source: Annual Report of Commercial Banks (Various Years) and Banking and  









Distribution of Loans by Business Types: SCBNL  
 
Year  2001 Share  2003 Share  2005 Share 
Agricultural Sector  7.54  0.2  129.12  2.2  345.24  4.3 
Industrial  Sector  2,491.62 45.0  2,351.23 40.0  2,283.75 28.2 
Commercial  Sector  979.85 17.7 676.32 11.5 2,326.27  28.7 
Services  Sector  627.81 11.3  615.73 10.5  641.79 7.9 
General use & Social Purpose  1,430.69  25.8  2,104.79  35.8  2,509.06  30.9 
Total    5,537.51 100  5,877.20 100  8,106.10 100 













Distribution of Loans by Business Types: NIB 
         
Year  2001  Share  2003  Share  2005  Share 
Agricultural  Sector  1.79 0.2 21.92 0.5  59.14 0.7 
Industrial  Sector  1,675.64 68.9  2,612.96 44.1  4,361.83 41.7 
Commercial  Sector  445.66 18.3  1,555.46 26.3  2,544.28 24.3 
Services  Sector  172.28  7.1 828.26 13.9  1,164.85 11.1 







Total    2,429.03 100  5,921.77 100  10,453.16 100 
                      Source: Annual Report of Commercial Banks (Various Years) and Banking and Financial Statistics, NRB, July 2005. 
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Thus, despite some structural problems, the financial liberalization has brought about 
significant changes in the structure and character of the Nepalese banking sector. The most visible 
change is the emergence of new private sector banks as well as the entry of several joint venture 
banks. The increased competition followed by efficiency enhancement in the private sector banks is 
pushing public sector banks to move towards the same direction. The emergence of the new banks 
has increased professionalism in the banking sector. Joint venture banks tend to perform better than 
domestic banks through service diversification and operational efficiency. This has reoriented the 
whole banking system in the same direction. One problem observed in the private banks, however, is 
that they generally avoid risky lending. Consequently, their business is concentrated in urban areas 
and  they give low priority to  small business. 
 6.2 Risk Management    
 
The risk management of the commercial banks is at a very primitive stage. Their risk 
management is mainly based on the compliance of the directives issued by the Nepal Rastra Bank. A 
few banks like Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Ltd. and Laxmi Bank Ltd have formed risk 
management committees.  But the committees are not functional. Some of the banks have developed 
a consumer scoring model on their own initiatives. Very few banks have their internal risk based 
provisioning model. Where such models exist, they are not the major criteria for decisions on loans 
or for the provisioning of loan losses. Advanced forms of loan grading and credit portfolio 
management models are not used by the Nepalese commercial banks. In publishing their financial 
statements, all banks use the  criteria prescribed by the Nepal Rastra Bank.  
 
6.3 Employment and Gender Mainstreaming 
 
Table 6.10 shows trends in the employment structure of three different banks. In the case of 
the government owned bank, almost no change in the ratio of male and female employment is 
observed for the period under consideration. Out of total employment, the percentage of female 
employment has never reached 13 per cent. It seems that, in the course of retiring employees with 
restructuring, of the bank, more females than males were let go, despite their share in total 
employment already being low. On the other hand, a marked increase in female employment took 
place in the years 2000 to 2005 in the private banks, more so than in the domestic private bank. 
However, in terms of distribution, almost 50 percent of positions was occupied by female employees 
in 2004 in the joint venture bank. Thus, the employment structure shows that financial liberalization 
coupled with open up policies contributed to strengthen gender mainstreaming processes.  
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Table 6.10  
Employment by Gender 
                
  Govt. Owned RBB  Private Owned NIB  Joint Venture SCB 
Year    Total Male  Female  Total Male  Female  Total Male  Female 
2000 5809  5069  740  98  86  12  264 180  84 
2001  5743  5017  726 107 90  17 256  179  77 
2002  5583  4879  704 105 85  20 243  158  85 
2003  5402  4710  692 254  186  68 275  176  99 
2004  3996  3485 511  325  223 102  317  162 155 
2005  3551  3105 446  353  234 119  335  204 131 
Share in Total Employment 
2000 100.00 87.26  12.74 100.00 87.76  12.24 100.00 68.18  31.82 
2001 100.00 87.36  12.64 100.00 84.11  15.89 100.00 69.92  30.08 
2002 100.00 87.39  12.61 100.00 80.95  19.05 100.00 65.02  34.98 
2003 100.00 87.19  12.81 100.00 73.23  26.77 100.00 64.00  36.00 
2004 100.00 87.21  12.79 100.00 68.62  31.38 100.00 51.10  48.90 
2005 100.00 87.44  12.56 100.00 66.29  33.71 100.00 60.90  39.10 
   Source: Annual Reports of Banks.   59
VII: Conclusions and Policy Implications  
7.1 Conclusions 
 
–  Liberalization and open up policies in Nepal were started in the mid-1980s and intensified 
from the beginning of the 1990s. Financial sector liberalization has been part and parcel of 
such a liberalization program. The financial system has rapidly developed and is diversified 
today. In terms of ownership structure of the banks, 2 are government owned, 9 are domestic 
private sector owned, and 6 are joint venture banks. Out of the 21 insurance companies, 3 are 
joint venture companies, 3 are foreign owned, 14 are private domestic owned, and one is 
government owned.  
 
–  The total financial assets of the financial system was about 90 per cent of GDP in 2005. The 
ratios of deposit and credit to GDP also show growing importance of the financial system. A 
big change in the market share of the banking system is also taking place in recent years. The 
asset share of the two government-owned banks reduced to 38.1 per cent in 2005 from 56.6 per 
cent in 2000. The decline in the credit share has been sharper, from 56.7 per cent to 29.4 per 
cent over the same period.  
 
–  Along with financial deepening and growth in flow of credit to trade and industry, a rapid 
change in the economic and employment structure is taking place in the economy. In the first 
five years of  intensive liberalization (1990-95), the rate of growth GDP was also high at 4.9 
percent. The growth in the non-agricultural sector was very high at 10 percent. A rapid 
expansion in  private sector activities in manufacturing, trade, transport, finance and real estate 
made this possible. The service sector grew more rapidly during this period. However, the 
Nepalese experience shows that the initial growth momentum could not continue for long. This 
had some adverse effect on the rapidly changing structure of the economy. Besides the 
worsening security and political situation, problems in the policy and institutional fronts 
occurred. The financial system went into deeper crisis  due to the near insolvency of two state 
owned banks. A review of the policies and a comparative assessment on the performance and 
efficiency of the government owned, domestic private sector owned and joint venture banks 
gives some understanding of this state of affairs. Assessment of insurance companies also 
gives some insights into the functioning of insurance companies. Critical examination of the 
role and effectiveness of the commercial banks and insurance companies is of utmost 
importance  in view of Nepal's commitments in WTO to pursue more open up and 
liberalization policies. Nepal's membership in SAFTA and BIMSTEC has further necessitated 
such a critical assessment.  
 
–  A critical review of policy shows that some liberalization policies toward the financial system 
were initiated in 1984. In this year deregulation of the interest rate structure and opening up of 
the banking sector to foreigner interests was started. From 1989, NRB also began to fix the 
capital adequacy ratio. In the same year, an upper limit on the amount of loan to be provided to 
a single borrower or group of borrowers by a bank was fixed. The Central Bank also 
introduced open market operations as a tool of monetary policy 1990. However, the slow or 
very limited reforms were far from adequate either to expand financial institutions or to 
enhance efficiency in the system.  
 
–  A more intensive reform was started from the early 1990s. During the first half of the 1990s, 
more liberal policies in granting licenses for opening new banks were pursued. The 
Development Bank Act 1995 and Financial Intermediary Institutions Act 1998 were introduced   60
to attract the private sector and NGOs to establish financial institutions in  rural areas. 
Prudential norms were also gradually refined and strengthened. However, contrary to liberal 
policies, the mandatory priority sector lending program started in 1974 was further expanded 
by raising the lending ratio from 8 percent in 1985 to 12 percent in the liberalization period. 
Only in a recent policy announcement, has the Central Bank committed to phase out priority 
sector lending by 2007. All these policies and other interrelated measures, however, were 
highly inadequate to address growing crises in the two government owned banks. Lack of 
autonomy, frequent government intervention, and very weak supervisory and regulatory 
capacity of the Central Bank were some of the principal reasons for this. 
 
-  Some notable steps were taken only in 2002 to bring institutional reforms in the banking 
system. A comprehensive Financial Sector Reform Program, with the support of the World 
Bank and other donors, was introduced in that year. The enactment of New NRB Act 2002 and 
some other steps to enforce better prudential regulations are the outcome of this. The Nepal 
Rastra Bank Act 2002 provides sufficient authority to the Central Bank in maintaining 
financial discipline and performing regulatory and supervisory role more effectively. As a part 
of the ongoing reform, these two commercial banks (NBL and RBB) were contracted out to the 
foreigners in 2003. Very recently the Banking and Financial Act 2006 (an umbrella Act 
covering all financial institutions) has been enacted with the aim of bringing more reforms to 
financial institutions in a more co-ordinated way. A number of specific policy measures are 
being simultaneously pursued either to increase the capital base of the banks or to enhance 
prudential regulation system. This has been particularly necessary in view of Nepal's 
commitments to allow foreign wholesale banking by January 2010.  
 
–  Performance indicators like net profit, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, and interest 
spreads covering the pre and post liberalization period show that the major problem lies in the 
government-owned banks. A comparative assessment of these ratios reveals that the 
profitability of the joint venture banks has substantially increased over time. A similar pattern 
is observed in the domestic private sector banks. However, the case of government-owned 
banks is entirely different. Along with a surge in non-performing loans in the total loan 
portfolio (reaching above 60 percent in both banks in 2003), the loss in these banks increased 
enormously since 1995. Interestingly, only after contracting out of these banks as a part of 
overall financial sector reform, could they  make net profits. One equally important 
phenomenon is that, along with financial sector liberalization, a continuous reduction in the 
interest spreads has taken place. This is true in case of government banks also. Despite this, 
they have also started recording positive net profits. Thus, the Nepalese experience indicates 
that increased competition backed by institutional and structural reforms are keys to improving 
performance of the banking system. It is also clear from the Nepalese experience that even in 
the liberalized environment such a built-in structure is generally lacking in the state-owned 
banks. In such banks, only severe crises or shocks compel broad based reforms. Additional 
indices related to competition and efficiency corroborate this.  
 
–  Efficiency and competition related indicators like net interest margin, overhead cost to total 
assets and pre-tax profit to total assets indicate that performance of both domestic private 
banks and joint venture banks is very satisfactory. With competition they have been able to 
enhance their efficiency. However, an opposite trend is found in the government-owned banks. 
Only after the restructuring and reforms were improvements observed in indicators of 
efficiency. Our findings suggest that both structural impediments and market structures are 
critically important in driving bank efficiency in countries like Nepal. Therefore, liberalization 
policies without simultaneous emphasis on changes in ownership and market structure will be 
less useful in improving the performance of the  banking system. The inability of state-owned   61
banks to restructure and diversify lending portfolios in the competitive market prevents them  
covering the marginal cost of funds plus intermediation costs. Compulsion to make higher loan 
loss provisions for non-performing loans amidst limited earning assets remaining in the 
portfolio tends to generate crisis in the state-owned banks.  
 
-  The positive relationship between financial development and growth was analysed in an 
economic model. The results showed a strong link between financial development and 
economic growth in the Nepalese context. In view of financial deepening represented by the 
growth of private sector credit, the results suggest that private sector credit is the better 
measure of financial deepening or development. Despite financial crisis in state-owned banks, 
bank credit expansion contributed to growth in Nepal. Had there been improved access of 
credit to the lower income strata and poor people, the growth would have been broad based.  
Based on the survey data, it is found that only 8.3 percent of the poorest consumption quintile 
has access to bank credit.  
 
–  Employment patterns also show divergent trends. On the whole, the level of employment has 
been reduced in the liberalized financial regime. This is, however, due to a policy of reducing 
the size of the employees in the government banks as a part of their restructuring. In the private 
banks, the level of employment has gradually increased. The increase in the level of 
employment in the joint venture banks is much more pronounced. Nepalese experience, thus, 
refutes the notion that with the permission to the joint venture banks, there is a tendency of 
direct displacement of domestic employees by  foreign workers.  
 
–  With the liberalization of the insurance sector, the private sector is increasingly occupying a 
major share in the insurance business as one-third of the market now is occupied by privately 
owned companies. Total premium income has increased rapidly, from less than 0.50 percent of 
the total non-agricultural GDP in 1994 to 1.86 percent in 2005. Correspondingly, the investable 
reserve fund is also growing. It is noteworthy that, out of the total investment, more than 80 
percent is kept in the form of fixed deposit in commercial banks. There is also steady rise in the 
employment.  
 
–  Case studies carried out in three commercial banks, namely Rastriya Banijya Bank 
(government owned), Nepal Investment Bank Limited (domestic private bank) and Standard 
Chartered Bank Nepal Limited (joint venture bank), show almost similar patterns as noted 
above. Performance indicators like net profit to total income, net profit to total assets, loan to 
staff ratio and fee-based income to total income reveal that joint venture and private banks 
were the best performers.  
 
–  Employment by gender in these banks exhibits an interesting trend. Almost no change in the 
ratio of female to male employment is observed in government-owned bank. It seems, in the 
course of restructuring, more female employees were out of the job as the declining ratio of 
female employees indicates. On the other hand, a marked increase in the female employment 
took place in the years 2000 to 2005 in the private banks, more so in the domestic private bank. 
The employment structure shows that financial liberalization coupled with open up policies 
contributed to strengthen the gender mainstreaming processes.  
7.2 Policy Implications  
 
-  Nepal's experience shows that structural and institutional reforms should be part and parcel of 
liberalization policies. Institutional capacity enhancement of the Central Bank and   62
effectiveness in  prudential regulations are crucial for making ongoing reform effective and 
result oriented.   
 
-  Reforms in ownership and market structures will be particularly important in view of Nepal's 
commitment to allow foreign wholesale banking and insurance companies in the domestic 
market. Raising the capital base of the banks and removing government control and 
interference in the two banks (NBL and RBB) will be necessary. The non-performing loans of 
the state owned banks are a major obstacle to enhance efficiency in these banks. In order to 
bring about  loan recovery from major defaulters and  sweeping reforms in these bank such 
steps are necessary.  
 
-  Nepal's experience with financial liberalization suggests that the multilateral route could be 
beneficial to her in pursuing broader trade liberalization policies. By the same token, the 
speedy  introduction of new Acts in fulfilling commitments under WTO would be necessary to 
strengthen market institutions. The introduction of legislation prescribing bank rules, banking 
fraud control laws, asset securitization laws, and trustee laws, are essential.  
 
-  One of the problems experienced in the course of intensive liberalization is that, despite 
financial deepening, access to credit by the rural population has not improved. This is also true 
of small businesses operating in urban areas. In order to overcome this, policy should focus on 
the growth of micro credit institutions and community - based self-help, saving and credit 
groups and cooperatives. This will ease pressures on the Government or Central Bank in 
forcing commercial banks to divert resources to less profitable, more risky ventures. It may 
also prevent crowding out of funds available to the private sector.  
 
-  For the enhancement of technical or institutional capacity of the baking system including the 
Central Bank, some support measures through WTO would be desirable for least developed 
countries like Nepal. In view of small business being adversely affected by ongoing reforms, 
some safeguard measures for them through WTO would also be desirable.  
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Annex 1 





Variables With  Trends 
1 PSC  -3.25 
2  ∆PSC -3.85 
3 GGDP  -9.22 
4  ∆GGDP -18.39 
5 PCI  -3.50 
6  ∆PCI -7.42 
7 POPG  -3.08 
8  ∆POPG -4.31 
9 TGDP  -2.27 
10  ∆TGDP -4.74 
11 FL  -3.86 
12  ∆FL -4.81 
13 TIGDP  -1.66 
14  ∆TIGDP -5.75 
15 M2GDP  -1.05 
16  ∆M2GDP -3.18 
 Critical  Value   











      Source: IPRAD Calculation 
 